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“International law is merely a magnifying mirror that reflects 
faithfully and cruelly the essence and logic of international politics.   
In a fragmented world, there is no ‘global perspective’ from which anyone 
can authoritatively assess, endorse, or reject the separate national efforts 
at making international law serve national interests above all.  Like the somber universe  
of Albert Camus’ Caligula, this is a judgeless world 
where no one is innocent.” 3
Why do American and European attitudes towards international law appear to 
differ so profoundly?  What explains the United States’ (supposedly) characteristic 
“unilateralism” in international law?4 This essay examines one very rich and fascinating 
theory of the difference – that of Professor Jed Rubenfeld of the Yale Law School5 -- and 
advances another.  To be more exact, the essay analyzes Professor Rubenfeld’s theory, 
which is framed primarily in terms of the differences between American and European 
constitutional values, and attempts to weight its merits against those of a theory that focuses 
instead on divergent political interests. 
 
1 My title alludes, of course, to Robert Kagan’s now-famous remark that “on major strategic and international 
questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and 
Power:  America and Europe in the New World Order 4 (2003). 
2 Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.  Former Deputy General Counsel, 
White House Office of Homeland Security; Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of 
Justice; Special Counsel to the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor.  B.A. Columbia summa cum laude; B.A. 
Oxford, First class; B. Phil. Oxford; J.D. Harvard School of Law cum laude.  My chief thanks go to the 
United States-Israel Educational Foundation for inviting me to present an earlier version of this paper at the 
Fulbright Israel/USIEF 50th Anniversary Symposium, “International Influences on National Legal Systems,” 
held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya on January 29-30, 2006.  
I also wish to thank John O. McGinnis and John C. Yoo for their valuable comments.   
3 Stanley Hoffman, “The Uses and Limits of International Law,” excerpted in Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis 
(eds.), International Politics:  Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision Making 126, 129 (2d ed. 
1985). 
4 A disclaimer:  As a government attorney at the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice, I 
provided advice regarding some of the U.S. legal positions discussed in this essay. 
5 See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971 (2004). 
2Outline
We shall begin with an introductory overview of recent American-European 
conflicts over the application of international law.  The overview will consider four 
situations in which such conflict has emerged.  We shall argue that the United States has 
had reasonable international law defenses for its conduct in each of those instances and, 
indeed, that it has the better of the legal argument in most of them.  The common 
European charge that the United States has been merely “lawless” in its recent conduct in 
international affairs6 thus seems exaggerated and unfounded.  Nonetheless, there are 
sufficiently serious and substantial differences between the United States and Europe over 
the status and application of international legal norms that some theoretical explanation for 
those differences seems required.  The attempt to find a satisfactory explanation unfolds 
into three main parts.    
Part I outlines Professor Rubenfeld’s theory of the difference between American 
and European attitudes toward international law.  Rubenfeld’s theory depends on a 
contrast between two distinct conceptions of constitutional law:  one that he calls 
“democratic constitutionalism,” and the other that he calls “international 
constitutionalism.”  Democratic constitutionalism, which reflects a characteristically 
 
6 Thus, to take one entirely representative European intellectual, the British-Polish sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman informs us that Europe – “and only Europe” – can offer a “salutary alternative” to America in the 
creation of a humane and civilized world order:  “At a time when America, which relegated Europe to the 
second division of power games, has . . . ‘disqualified itself from the fight for security, prosperity, and justice,’ 
Europe . . . stoutly refuses ‘to regard force as a source of justice,’ and even more so to confuse the two, and it 
is well placed to ‘oppose the United States as justice opposes force rather than as weakness opposes power’.”  
Zygmunt Bauman, Europe:  An Unfinished Adventure 39 (2004) (italics in original, citations omitted).  In a 
similar vein, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has opined that “[t]he Bush administration, with 
moralistic phrases ad acta, has laid aside the 220-year-old Kantian project for the legalizing of international 
relations. The comportment of the American administration allows for only one conclusion, that, as they see 
it, international law is finished as a medium for the resolution of conflicts between states, and for the 
advancement of democracy and human rights.”  “America and the World:  A Conversation with Jürgen 
Habermas, with Eduardo Mendieta, available at http://www.logosjournal.com/habermas__america.htm (italics 
in originsl).  
3American outlook, traces the nation’s organic law to a founding act of popular lawmaking.  
International constitutionalism sees constitutional law, not as deriving from an act of 
democratic self-government, but as a deriving from universal, hence transnational, 
principles and rights.  These principles and rights – in effect, an overarching structure of 
natural law in which particular national régimes should be embedded -- operate to restrain 
rather than to express democracy.  On Rubenfeld’s account, international constitutionalism 
underlies the legal systems of at least some of the major western European nations.  The 
divergent constitutional traditions of the United States and Europe reflect, in large 
measure, the different reactions of the United States and Europe to the horrors of Nazism 
and the violence of the Second World War.  Each of these conceptions of 
constitutionalism generates, in turn, a distinctive approach to international law.        
 Rubenfeld’s analysis is framed in terms of the different values expressive of two 
different constitutional traditions and cultures.  Without altogether disagreeing with it, we 
shall argue that an alternative theory seems to have equal, if not more, explanatory power.  
Part II offers a theory of the international law divergence between the U.S. and Europe that 
sounds in interests rather than in values. (It is, therefore, a more banal and commonplace 
explanation than Rubenfeld’s7).  On this alternative approach, both U.S. and European 
policymakers and élites use international law instrumentally, to promote and serve 
competing national interests in various ways.8
7 Rubenfeld does not deny the possibility of interest-based explanations, but contends that by “explaining 
everything so well, [they] explain little with any depth.”  Rubenfeld, supra n.--, at 1984. 
8 The “Realist” school of international relations has long taken the view that international law may be, and 
often is, used both to cloak and to promote national or hegemonic interests.  See, e.g., Edward Hallett Carr, 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939:  An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (2d ed. 1946) 
at 73-75, 82-83.   Carr is also correct to insist, however, that “[t]he necessity, recognized by all politicians, both 
in domestic and international affairs, for cloaking interests in the guise of moral principles is itself a symptom 
of the inadequacy of realism.”  Id. at 92.     
4The proffered explanation takes its start from the unremarkable observation that 
the post-Cold War United States is the global hegemon.  In the United States’ view of itself, 
it uses its power benignly9: it functions as the chief global provider of public goods, 
including peace, order and trade.10 This is not of course due entirely to altruism on the 
part of the United States, but it may well have some altruistic features.  The real risk to 
global peace and order is not that the United States will behave more and more like a 
traditional imperial power, but that its people will weary of their nation’s global 
responsibilities (“isolationism”)11 or that, as theorists like Paul Kennedy12 and Niall 
Ferguson13 have forecast, it will find itself financially overspent and overstretched.     
Despite their reluctance to admit it, moreover, it seems likely that, at present, most 
other major nations, including the European ones, largely agree in practice with the United 
States’ self-image, and are not actively seeking to overturn the American ascendancy.   In 
the sixty years of the Long Peace that has settled on it since the end of the Second World 
War, Western Europe has benefited substantially from America’s dominant global role.   
 
9 The view that the U.S.’ hegemonic role is generally benign is shared by American writers of very different 
ideological standpoints.  Compare George Weigel, “Moral Clarity in a Time of War,” available at 
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0301/articles/weigel.html with Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why 
Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos 109, 127 (2002). For a far less sympathetic (European) reading of 
American dominance and its uses, see Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American 
Order (2003).  For a critical American perspective, see Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads:  
Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy 111-13 (2006). 
10 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, “Using Force,” 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 729, 792-93 (2004) (analyzing questions of 
international security in terms of “public goods” approach); Lea Brilmayer, American Hegemony:  Political 
Morality in A One-Superpower World 115-18 (1994) (outlining “hegemonic stability theory”); see also 
Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath:  How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 21st 
Century  (2005).   
11 See Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics 168-69 (pb. ed 1983) (analyzing why the costs of 
dominance for a hegemonic power tend to rise and pointing out the consequences of the fact that hegemonic 
providers of public goods tend to overpay for them:  “[t]he increasing costs of protection and the fact that . . . 
hegemonic powers tend to overpay mean that in time the costs of protection of the status quo rise faster than 
[its] economic benefits . . . .  With increasing costs and decreasing revenues, . . . hegemony become[s] 
decreasingly profitable.  As in any enterprise, a decrease in the rate of profit is a sign of potential 
bankruptcy.”).   See also Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion:  Why New Great Powers Will Arise,” 
17 Int’l Security 5, 34 (1993) (even “benign” hegemony tends to precipitate the hegemon’s relative decline). 
12 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:  Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (1989). 
13 See Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (2004). 
5But it appears that Europe rests less and less easy under the current arrangements.  To 
some extent, political and military cooperation with the United States is simply less 
necessary after the Soviet collapse.  Moreover, if Europe faces a “near enemy,” it is Islamic 
and, to a great extent, disturbingly home-grown.14 But it is not at all certain that close 
cooperation with the United States would be the most effective way to counter that threat.   
 The post-Cold War stage is therefore set for the emergence of conflicts between the 
United States and Europe; and those conflicts have begun to dawn.  One might even trace 
the origins of renewed conflict as far back as an early phase of the Cold War – the 1957 
creation of the six-member European Economic Community.  For as Richard Rosecrance 
has argued, European economic and political integration after 1957 “provided a make-
weight to the two [Cold War] superpowers.  One must remember that the launching of 
Europe took place after the invasions of Suez and Hungary and (from a European point of 
view) reflected the unreliability of the alliance with America as well as the probable hostility 
of the Soviet Union.”15 Whenever one thinks they were first planted, the seeds of what 
looks not unlike a traditional Great Power rivalry seem to have started to sprout.16 The 
 
14 See generally Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (2004); Gilles Kepel, The 
Revenge of God (1994).  Large numbers of young European Muslims, even if born in Europe and outwardly 
assimilated, “are drawn to the idea of a Muslim ‘ummah’ (nation) to which they could belong.”  Roula Khalaf 
and Jonathan Guthrie, “Europe’s radical young Muslims turn to violence,” The Financial Times at A2 (July 
9/10, 2005); see also Robert Winnard and David Leppard, “Leaked No. 10 dossier reveals Al-Qaeda’s 
British recruits,” The Sunday Times (July 10, 2005), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-
1688261,00.html. An unknown number of radicalized young British and French Muslims have also been 
volunteering to join al Qaeda forces fighting in Iraq, giving rise to police fears of violent “blowback” when 
they return.  See Peter Taylor, “A reason to hate,” The Guardian (Sept. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329566119-111274,00.html.
15 Richard Rosecrance, “Mergers and Acquisitions,” The National Interest 65, 67 (Summer 2005). 
16 The possibility of the emergence of traditional “Great Power” conflict between the United States and 
Europe (or some parts of Europe) cannot be dismissed as idle.  Indeed, the historical record shows that very 
existence of a hegemonic power, even a non-threatening, “benign” one, is likely to produce rivals.  “This is 
because the threat inheres in the hegemon’s power.  In a unipolar world, others must worry about the 
hegemon’s capabilities, not its intentions.  The preeminent power’s intentions may be benign today but may 
not be tomorrow. . . .  Moreover, even a hegemon animated by benign motives may pursue policies that run 
counter to others’ interests.”  Layne, supra n.--, at 13-14.  The United States’ own history demonstrates that as 
the nation’s power grew in the late nineteenth century, it grew increasingly restive under the hegemony of 
6pervasive presence of American hegemony may be creating a classic “security dilemma”17
for European nations that will ultimately drive them towards complete political integration 
and the formation of a unitary European “superstate.”18 
We may take the existence, or at least emerging possibility, of such American-
European rivalry as the basis for an explanation of the two parties’ divergent attitudes 
toward international law.  Such an explanation would differ from Rubenfeld’s in seeing 
conflicting interests, and not differing values, as the chief source of the divergence.  The 
United States is interested in maintaining its dominating position in world affairs; Europe is 
interested, not so much perhaps in supplanting the United States, as in checking and 
counter-balancing it.  International law then becomes an instrument that can be wielded in 
that power conflict. 
 Nonetheless, we will also argue, both sides also have a substantial interest in 
mitigating the conflicts between them and in restoring their relations nearer to equilibrium.  
This, of course, includes compromising their outstanding differences over international 
law.  We shall argue that we are seeing specific attempts to bridge over these legal 
differences, and that the initiatives are coming from both sides.  To illustrate this tendency, 
we will briefly discuss Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, which in 
practical terms (whether or not in legal effect) cleansed the United States’ occupation of 
Iraq from the taint of illegitimacy caused by the (assumedly) unauthorized use of force 
against that country earlier in the year.   
 
Great Britain, even though the United States was a major beneficiary of Britain’s preeminence and was hardly 
threatened by it.  See id. at 27-28. 
17 See John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” in John H. Herz, The Nation-
State and the Crisis of World Politics:  Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century 72-98 
(1976). 
18 See Glyn Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate:  Public Justification and European Integration 161-
62 (2005). 
7Finally, in Part III, we shall attempt, very briefly and allusively, to outline a possible 
approach that seeks to reconcile Professor Rubenfeld’s values-based theory with the theory 
that emphasizes national interests.  This attempt at reconciliation starts from the 
observation, made several years ago by the distinguished political scientist Robert Putnam, 
that  
[t]he politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-
level game.  At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by 
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power 
by constructing coalitions among those groups.  At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.[19]
Although Putnam’s theory has its origins in international negotiations over matters 
such as trade and currency rates, it can be adapted to negotiations over human rights and 
international humanitarian law.  Viewing Euro-American differences over international law 
as such a two-level game, one can appreciate, first, that important European domestic 
political constituencies may have strongly critical views of American foreign and military 
policies, based on the values and norms that those constituencies espouse; second, that 
European governments, including of course their executive branches, will inevitably be 
highly sensitive to those constituencies’ demands, and will reflect them in their policy 
deliberations and choices; but also that, third, those executive branches will be dealing with 
the United States across a wide array of matters of common concern, will look for the 
United States’ support and cooperation on many of them, and will therefore be reluctant to 
offend the United States (or its executive) unduly.  Hence one would expect to find – and, 
it is argued, we do in fact find – a pattern of, on the one hand, highly vocal, values-based 
European condemnations of American foreign and military policies that uses the language 
 
19 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics:  the logic of two-level games,” 42 Int’l Organizations 
427, 434 (1988). 
8of international law and, on the other hand, a more muted, less censorious approach to the 
same American policies on the part of European governments, especially executive 
branches.      
In this type of analysis of Euro-American differences over international law, both 
“values” and “interests” contribute to the explanation.  “Values” drive the condemnations 
of interested sectors of European publics, “interests” underlie the more tempered and 
pragmatic approach of European leaders.  
Introduction and Overview
That there are deep differences between the United States and several of its major 
continental European allies (chiefly France and Germany) seems plain enough.  We need 
only consider the visit in January, 2006 by the new German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to 
Washington, D.C., during which she repeated, both privately to President Bush and in 
public, an opinion that she had previously expressed in an interview with Der Spiegel -- that 
the United States’ detention camps at Guantanamo Bay “should not exist.”20 The existence 
of these camps is, of course, a longstanding cause of complaint by European leaders.21 
Chancellor Merkel’s references to it seemed only to underscore the depth and persistence 
of American and European views of the legality of the United States’ practice.22 
20 See “M. Bush defend la ‘nécessité’ de Guantanamo devant Mme Merkel; En visite à Washington, la 
chancelière allemande a exposé sa ‘divergence’ sur la base de Guantanamo.  George Bush n’a rien cédé,”  Le 
Monde at 6 (Jan. 15, 2006), 2006 WLNR 794189.   
21 See, e.g., Michael Byers, War Law:  Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict 129 (2005) 
(“Rumsfeld’s disdain for international humanitarian law became blatantly apparent in January 2002 when 
suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda members were transported to the US naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  
Ignoring public criticism from a number of European leaders, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and even the normally neutral and extraordinarily discrete [sic] International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the Secretary of Defense insisted the detainees were not prisoners of war . . . .  In November 2002, the 
English Court of Appeal correctly described the position of the Guantánamo Bay detainees as ‘legally 
objectionable’; it was as if they were in a ‘legal black hole.’”). 
22 Subsequently, in an interview on May 4, 2006 with ARD German Television, President Bush, after 
emphasizing the closeness both of the U.S-German alliance and of his own personal relationship with 
Chancellor Merkel (“I call her Angela, by the way”) told his German audience that “obviously, the 
9But appearances can be deceptive; and even this apparently significant conflict 
between German and American legal and policy views proves, on closer examination, to be 
far more muted than it might at first have seemed.  Aides to Chancellor Markel reportedly 
worked hard to persuade the German press delegation that her visit to Washington “is not 
about detentions art Guantanamo Bay,” and the Chancellor’s remarks to Der Spiegel were, 
so a British paper said, “an attempt to get an awkward subject out of the way early.”23 The 
U.S. State Department’s press release, headlined by a reference to the President and 
Chancellor’s “full agreement on Iran,” stated only that “the two leaders said in a joint press 
conference that their meeting marked a renewed sense of unity of purpose between the two 
allies despite a continuing difference on issues such as the detainees in the War on Terror 
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”24 At the press conference itself, Chancellor Merkel said 
merely that she had “mentioned Guantanamo” in her meeting with the President.  When 
the President responded by affirming unequivocally that “Guantanamo is a necessary part 
of protecting the American people,” the Chancellor replied mildly that “what counts is that 
we come back to the situation where we openly address all of the issues.”25 In other words, 
the fact that the two leaders were able to discuss Guantanamo candidly was to be taken as 
 
Guantánamo issue is a sensitive issue for people.  I very much would like to end Guantánamo; I very much 
would like to get people to a court.”  Interview of the President by Sabine Christiansen of ARD German 
Television (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/print/20060507-
3.html. See also Press Conference of the President (June 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060614.html (“I’d like to close Guantánamo, but I also 
recognize that we’re holding some people that are darn dangerous”).  
23 “Merkel foreign policy signals warmer relationship with US.  Bernard Benoit reports on the German 
chancellor’s aim of correcting the balance in her country’s ties with Washington and Moscow,” The Financial 
Times at 8 (Jan. 13, 2006), 2006 WL 718362. 
24 “State Dept.:  Bush, Germany’s Merkel in Full Agreement on Iran,” US Fed. News (pg. unavailable)(Jan. 
13, 2006), 2006 WLNR 768294. 
25 “Remarks by President Bush and Chancellor Angela Merkel of the Federal Republic of Germany in Joint 
Press Availability,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary (transcript) (Jan. 13, 2006).  In fact, the 
Chancellor went even further to minimize the disagreement.  She stated that the question of detention was 
“only one facet in our overall fight against terrorism” and that she “completely share[d] [President Bush’s} 
assessment as regards the nature and dimension of th[e terrorist] threat.”  Indeed, she even implicitly faulted 
her own and other European countries which, she said “need to come up with convincing proposals as to 
how we ought to deal with detainees.”  Id.. 
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evidence, not so much of an intractable difference over the requirements of international 
law, as of the strength, intimacy and resilience of the German-American alliance. 
 The lesson to be drawn from the Bush-Merkel exchange is not, of course, that 
Americans and Europeans do not disagree in their attitudes towards international law.  
They do disagree, and the disagreements may be substantial.  But the exchange should also 
caution us not to exaggerate the differences.  Further, it is also fair to say that while there 
have been numerous conflicts in recent years between American and European 
governments on matters relating to international law, by no means all of those conflicts 
have involved real, or even alleged, violations of international law by the United States.  
Consider (briefly) the following four contentious episodes: 
The Kyoto Protocol: Notwithstanding vigorous European protests over the United 
States’ unwillingness to become a party to the Kyoto Protocol, there is no question but that, 
as a matter purely of international law, the United States was well within its rights, as a 
sovereign nation, not to ratify that treaty.26 Whatever the policy merits or demerits of the 
United States’ decision not to ratify, it was legally unassailable.  Indeed, if either side should 
be faulted for violating international law, it is those European parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
that the International Energy Agency reports have missed their targeted reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions.27 
26 There are some unusual circumstances in which a State can be deemed to be bound to discharge the 
obligations of a treaty to which it is not a signatory or a party.  However, as the International Court of Justice 
has noted, “it is not lightly to be presumed that a State which has not carried out these formalities [of 
ratification or accession], though at all times fully able and entitled to do so, has nevertheless somehow 
become bound in another way.”  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. Reports 4, 26.  There is no 
reason to think that the United States has become bound to the Kyoto Protocol in some such unusual way.   
27 See Robert J. Samuelson, “Greenhouse Hypocrisy,” The Washington Post at A 21 (June 29, 2005) (“Here 
are some IEA estimates of the increases [in carbon dioxide emissions]:  France, 6.9 percent; Italy, 8.3 
percent; Greece, 28.2 percent; Ireland, 40.3 percent; the Netherlands, 13.2 percent; Portugal, 59 percent; 
Spain, 46.9 percent.”).  The U.S. increase for the same period was 16.7%, not far from the global total of 
16.4%, and well below that of several European nations.  See also Dan Seligman, “Bye-Bye, Kyoto,” 177 
Forbes 130 (Jan. 9, 2006), 2006 WLNR 109018 (“The Kyoto rules say that western Europe must get their 
11
The ABM Treaty: On December 13, 2001, President Bush announced that the 
United States had given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with Article XV of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile [“ABM”] Treaty of 1972,28 that it would withdraw from the Treaty.  
Despite the misgivings that some expressed, the United States was in full compliance with 
international law in taking that step.  Article XV stated that “[e]ach party shall, in exercising 
its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its 
supreme interests.”  The Treaty demanded six months’ notice before withdrawal, which 
the United States gave.   The Treaty otherwise merely required the withdrawing party to 
provide the other party with an explanatory statement, apparently leaving it to each party’s 
unilateral judgment whether “extraordinary events” such as to “jeopardize[] its supreme 
interests” had arisen.29 President Bush’s announcement referred both to the fundamental 
changes that had occurred in world affairs since the Treaty had been formed in 1972 – 
including the disappearance of the Soviet Union, one of the two original signatories – and 
the risk that weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue 
States – a risk that, he said, required the United States to abandon “a treaty that prevents us 
 
emissions to a level 8% below those prevailing in 1990.  But virtually all those countries – the only significant 
exception is Germany – are going in the wrong direction.”); Jon Walter, “World faces massive increase in 
CO2 emissions as population grows,” Agence France Presse English Wire (July 19, 2005) (“Even those 
countries which have ratified the Kyoto protocol appear unlikely to meets its modest goals . . . .  Between 
1990 and 2002 Canada’s CO2 emissions rose by 22 percent and Japan by 13 percent while those of the EU 
emissions have risen by 3.4 percent.”); Amanda Brown, “EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rise,” Press 
Association News Wire (June 21, 2005) (“The worldwide bid to curb global warming suffered a major blow 
today as new figures showed EU emissions in the 15 oldest member states increased by 1.3% between 2002 
and 2003. . .   Today’s figures also show the EU is way off track in meeting its Kyoto Protocol target of cutting 
emissions by 8% by 2012.”)  Perhaps as a result of the failures of its member States to meet the treaty’s 
targets, the European Union has adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward the U.S. approach to the 
problems of climate change.  See Raf Casert, “EU, Washington look beyond Kyoto to tackle climate change,” 
Associated Press Worldstream (Feb. 22, 2005).  
28 Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435. 
29 See Frederick L. Kirgis, “Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty,” American Society of 
International Law Insights (May, 2001), and the ensuing addenda and correspondence, available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh70.htm.
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from developing effective defenses.”   Whether or not one agrees with the United States’ 
rationale, it would be hard to claim that it was utterly unreasonable, or that adopting it 
demonstrated disrespect for international treaty law.30 Moreover, as a strategic matter, the 
introduction of ABM systems would not affect the stability of the international security 
system by upsetting the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia; it did, 
however, hold out the possibility of neutralizing the more limited nuclear capacities of 
smaller, “rogue” States.31 European – and Russian – reaction to the United States’ action 
was muted.32 
The Rome Statute: The United States has also come under criticism from the 
European Union for its decision to “unsign” the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court [“ICC”].  Nonetheless, the decision to “unsign” the Treaty, 
while perhaps unprecedented, appears to be valid as a matter of international law.33 Article 
18(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties,34 while imposing interim obligations on a 
nation that has signed a treaty but not yet ratified it, also clearly contemplates that those 
interim obligations will lapse once the signatory “shall have made clear its intention not to 
become a party to the treaty.”  That clause seems clearly to entail that a signatory may 
indeed, before ratification, withdraw its signature from the treaty.  One careful legal study 
of the question of “unsigning” found that “the bottom line . . . is that if a signatory feels 
 
30 Accord W. Michael Reisman, “Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War,” 97 Am. J. Int’ L. 82, 86 
(2003) (“[T]he denunciation of the ABM treaty did not undermine the viability of the international treaty 
regime, for the treaty in question was susceptible, by its terms, to termination, on notice”). 
31 See id.. at 86, 89. 
32 See Eric A Posner, “International Law and the Disaggregated State,” 32 Fla. State U. L. Rev. 797, 822 & n. 
74 (2005). 
33 See Curtis A. Bradley, “U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty,” 
American Society of International Law Insights (May 2002), available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm.
34 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.  Although the 
United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on Treaties, it regards most of its clauses as merely 
declaratory of customary international law.  See S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971) (State 
Department description of Vienna Convention as “the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”). 
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burdened by the interim obligation, and contemplates taking acts that might be viewed as 
violating a treaty’s object and purpose, it can quickly disengage itself.”35 The United States 
surely “made clear its intention” not to ratify the Rome Statute in a variety of ways, 
including by sending formal notice to the Rome Statute’s depositary, the United Nations; 
by making clear official pronouncements both before and after submitting that formal 
notice of its intent to unsign; and by actively seeking to enter into treaty arrangements with 
nations hosting U.S. military bases that, if ratified, would tend to defeat the object and 
purpose of the Rome Statute.  Again, therefore, while European criticism of the United 
States’ decision not to participate in the ICC may or may not be sound as a policy matter, it 
is hard to find fault with the decision as a matter purely of international law. 
Even more importantly, the United States’ decision to unsign the Rome Statute did 
not evince an arrogant “unilateralism,” demonstrating the nation’s unwillingness to join 
other leading members of the world community in an international organization dedicated 
to enforcing the laws of war.  The United States has had a long record of supporting, and 
indeed initiating, legal developments in this area, including its roles in founding the 
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, in helping to establish and 
operate the United Nations’ war crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and even in 
negotiating the Rome Statute.  As William Schabas has observed,36 the U.S. decision not to 
participate in the ICC stemmed primarily from a fundamental change that was made during 
the negotiations concerning the powers of the Security Council.  In 1994, when the 
International Law Commission [“ILC”] presented its report on the proposed ICC to the 
 
35 Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2061, 2082-83 (2003); see also id. at 2089 (“Unsigning, in 
short, should be acknowledged as a legitimate and understandable course of action under the Vienna 
Convention . . . “).  
36 The discussion that follows in the text relies heavily on William A. Schabas, “United States Hostility to the 
International Criminal Court:  It’s All About the Security Council,” 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 701 (2004). 
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General Assembly, the United States was well-disposed to the idea.  The ILC’s draft treaty 
provided for an ICC that fitted neatly within the existing legal scheme of the United 
Nations Charter and that, therefore, was subordinate to the Security Council.  Draft Article 
23(3) of the ILC’s proposal would have provided that “No prosecution may be 
commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is being dealt with by the 
Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter 
VII of the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides” (emphasis added).   In 
effect, the ILC would have given the Security Council, and thus its Permanent Members 
(including the United States) a veto over prosecutions before the ICC.  Such an 
arrangement would have been consistent, not only with the overall Charter scheme, but 
with existing legal procedures for the ad hoc United Nations criminal tribunals.  At the 
insistence of nations such as Germany and Canada at a later phase of the negotiations, 
however, this provision was stricken.  In its place, Article 16 of the Rome Statute merely 
permits the Security Council, to delay prosecution for up to a year (subject to renewal).  To 
secure a temporary delay of even one year, the votes of all five Permanent Members of the 
Council, and a nine-vote majority of all the Members, is required.   This, of course, 
represents an extremely severe dilution of the United States’ ability to control prosecutions 
– a matter of overriding concern to it as the world’s dominant military power.37 The 
insistence of the nations that prevailed in the negotiations on this revision of the ILC draft 
seems to have stemmed from their resentment of the special position that the Charter 
secures for the Permanent Members of the Security Council.  In other words, the 
disagreement was in essence merely a power struggle between medium- and small-sized 
 
37 The veto has indeed always been an indispensable feature of the Charter scheme from the United States’ 
perspective.  See Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation:  The Founding of the United Nations 193-94 
(2003); Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 904 (3d ed. 1951). 
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powers and the United States.   It is surely difficult to see why the United States’ decision 
not to participate in the ICC on those unfavorable terms should be taken to show its 
hostility to international legal régimes, while Germany’s and Canada’s pursuit of their own 
realpolitik objectives, even at the risk of losing the United States’ crucial support for the 
ICC, should not.       
 The U.S.-Led 2003 Invasion of Iraq: The United States-led intervention in Iraq in 
March, 2003 was perhaps the most important occasion on which the United States differed 
vehemently from several of its traditional continental European allies over a vital question 
of international law.   The judgment of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan that 
the intervention was unlawful because the United States had not obtained specific 
authorization, in the form of a new Security Council Resolution, before beginning 
hostilities, is shared by many independent legal experts and scholars.38 Nonetheless, this 
episode hardly justifies European complaints that the United States has become heedless of 
international law.39 
As is well known, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter requires Member 
States to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
 
38 For Annan’s pre-war position, see Patrick E. Tyler and Felicity Barringer, “Annan Says U.S. Will Violate 
Charter if it Acts Without Approval,” The New York Times at A8 (March 11, 2003).  After the war, in an 
interview on September 16, 2004 with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Annan repeated his view that 
the intervention was illegal.  See “Excerpts:  Annan Interview,” available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle__east/3661640.htm (“I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN 
Charter, from our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal.”).      
39 See Jacques de Lisle, “Illegal?  Yes.  Lawless?  Not So Fast:  The United States, International Law, and the 
War in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (March 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030328.americawar.delisle.intllawwariraq.html (“True, the United States and its 
handful of active partners in the coalition did not obtain the Security Council’s specific authorization for their 
use of force against Iraq, nor has the Bush administration articulated a credible claim that this is a case that 
falls within one of the few, narrow exceptions permitting the international use of military force without 
Security Council authorization.  But, contrary to what much of the chorus of criticism asserts or assumes, 
unlawfulness is not the same as lawlessness.  Eschewing or rejecting prescribed legal processes is not the same 
thing as rejecting all legal principle.  Not adhering to the international legal requirements set forth in the U.N. 
Charter does not lead ineluctably to the world of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue in which the strong do what 
they wish and the weak do what they must.”).    
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”40 Under the Charter, armed 
force may be used by one State or group of States against another only in two 
circumstances.  First, Article 51 recognizes Member States’ “inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member,” but the United States 
and its coalition partners did not place their primary reliance on the argument that their 
action against Iraq was lawful under that provision.41 Second, Article 42 of Chapter VII of 
the Charter authorizes the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” in a troubled 
area.  The United States’ original intervention against Iraq in January, 1991, following upon 
 
40 On the background and meaning of the Charter clauses relating to international armed conflict, see, e.g., 
John F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs 142-44 (2004). 
41 To be more accurate:  the United States made an Article 51 argument to the Security Council, but in 
somewhat sketchy and allusive terms; the United Kingdom and Australia did not make such an argument in 
that forum.  See Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law 197-98, 205-07 
(2003).  Outside the United Nations, the United States did of course rely, sometimes quite heavily, on the 
claim that preemptive action or even preventive war against “rogue states” and terrorists was compatible with 
international law.  See generally The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 
2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html; see also Letter from President George W. Bush to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (March 21, 2003), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030321-5.html (stating President’s 
determination that further diplomatic efforts would “neither adequately protect the national security of the 
United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” nor “lead to the enforcement of all relevant United 
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq”).   For a thoughtful evaluation of the United States’ 
position, see Alan M. Dershowitz, Preemption:  A Knife That Cuts Both Ways 153-89 (2006). See also Ruth 
Wedgwood, “The Fall of Saddam Hussein:  Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense,” 97 
Am. J. Int’l L. 576, 582-85 (2003); Carl Bildt, “Pre-emptive military action and the legitimacy of the use of 
force:  A European Perspective” (CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Jan. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.eusec.org/bildt.html; Walter B. Slocombe, “Preemptive military action and the legitimate use of 
force:  An American Perspective,” CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Jan. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.eusec.org/slocombe.html.
The British position specifically rejected the idea that military action against Iraq was legally justified 
on the grounds of preemptive self-defense.  See “Extract from Debate in the British House of Lords,” (Apr. 
21, 2004) (remarks of Lord Goldsmith), reprinted in Mary Ellen O’Connell, International Law and the Use 
of Force 259-61 (2005).  Instead Britain relied on the argument that Iraq’s material breaches of Security 
Council Resolutions authorized the resumption of hostilities. See Letter from the Permanent Representative 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the United Nations 
Security Council (Mar. 20, 2003), U.N. Doc. S/2003/350 (2003); see also Lord Goldsmith, “Legal Basis for 
Use of Force Against Iraq,” (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.labour.org.uk/news/legalbasis: Murphy, 
supra n.--, at 171-72 (discussion and critique of Goldsmith opinion).  The legal analysis that Lord Goldsmith, 
Britain’s Attorney General, communicated privately to Prime Minister Blair was considerably more guarded 
than his public memorandum.  See “Full text: summary of attorney general's legal advice on March 7 2003,” 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1471655,00.html.
17
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, had been authorized on precisely such a basis:    
Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, enacted “under Chapter VII of the Charter,” 
expressly authorized “Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to 
use all necessary means” to enforce earlier Security Council Resolutions relating to the 
Kuwaiti crisis against Iraq in the event that Iraq failed to comply with them beforehand.    
The 1991 U.S.-led offensive came to a halt with the adoption of Security Council 
Resolutions 686 of March 2, 1991 and 687 of April 8, 1991, which imposed a variety of 
obligations upon the defeated Iraqi Government.  Both before and more especially after 
the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the United States sought 
to persuade the United Nations that Iraq remained a danger to regional, and world, peace 
and security.  Focusing on Iraq’s failure to permit United Nations inspectors immediate 
and unrestricted access to verify its undertaking to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, 
President Bush made it clear, in a speech to the General Assembly on September 12, 
2002, that the United States wanted and expected the Security Council to reauthorize 
armed intervention in Iraq, but that the United States was prepared to act unilaterally in the 
absence of such a Resolution (“We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the 
necessary resolutions.  But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted.”).42 
As a result of the intense diplomatic activity that ensued, the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII, adopted  Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002,  which in part decided that 
“Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, 
including resolution 687 (1991).”  Resolution 1441, however, unlike Resolution 678, did 
not in terms authorize the United States or other Member States to “use all necessary 
 
42 See “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” (Sept. 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.
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means” to bring Iraq into compliance.  Rather, Resolution 1441 reflected a two-stage 
approach that had been advocated by France:  disarmament through resumed inspections 
or, if that failed, reconsideration by the Security Council of its options, including recourse 
to force.43 Four months after the adoption of Resolution 1441, the United States and its 
coalition partners tabled a resolution that would have provided specific legal authorization 
to resume hostilities in Iraq.44 France, supported by Russia and China, announced publicly 
that it would veto the draft resolution, which in any case had no chance of passage and was 
withdrawn.45 
In these circumstances, the United States took the legal position that Resolution 
1441’s finding that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of Security Council 
Resolution 687, coupled with Iraq’s subsequent failure to cure those and other breaches 
after the adoption of Resolution 1441, authorized the United States and its coalition to 
resume the concededly lawful hostilities that had been suspended eleven years earlier by 
Resolution 687.46 Several prominent legal scholars agreed with the United States’ view.47 
Others, of course, did not.48 
43 See Remarks of M. Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, United 
Nations Security Council Fifty-eighth year, 4707th meeting Friday, 14 February 2003, 10 a.m. New York, U.N. 
Doc. S/PV.4707.   
44 See Provisional Resolution --, March 7, 2003, U.N. Doc. S/2003/215.  In any event, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell had stated previously that, in the event of an Iraqi breach of Resolution 1441, the Security Council 
could “decide whether or not action is required,” but the United States would “reserve our option of acting” 
unilaterally and would “not necessarily be bound by what the Security Council might decide at that point.”   
Quoted in Michael J. Glennon, “How War Left the Law Behind,” The New York Times at A33 (Nov. 21, 
2002). 
45 See Ayman El-Amir, “A world united against war,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online:  20-26 March 2003 (Issue 
No. 630), available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2003/630/sc2.htm. President Bush remarked that 
“some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution 
that compels the disarmament of Iraq . . . . The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its 
responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.”  “President George W. Bush Addresses the Nation on Iraq” (March 
17, 2003), reprinted in Craig R. Whitney (ed.), The WMD Mirage 166, 167-68 (2003). 
46 See  Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the 
United Nations Security Council (March 20, 2003), U.N. Doc. S/200/350; see also William H. Taft & Todd 
F. Buchwald, “Preemption, Iraq, and International Law,” 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 557 (2003).   Mr. Taft wrote as 
Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, and Mr. Buchwald as Assistant Legal Adviser. 
19
My purpose here is not to defend the United States’ legal position, nor even to 
argue that it was a reasonable (if perhaps erroneous) one.  Rather, I want only to make the 
point that even if the United States (and Britain and Australia) were clearly in error about 
the legality of using force against Iraq, the continental European governments that were 
critical of the coalition’s position themselves had “dirty hands.”    For the NATO Alliance’s 
armed intervention in 1999 in Kosovo, which was designed to prevent Serbia from carrying 
out its program of “ethnic cleansing” of that province, was certainly on no better footing 
under international law than the U.S. coalition’s intervention in Iraq in 2003.49 Having 
themselves violated the very same constraints of the U.N. Charter only four years earlier, 
the European governments involved in NATO’s Kosovo intervention could hardly claim 
that the United States was an international scofflaw for having done so.50 
47See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, “Comments on War,” 27 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 877, 889-91 (2004); 
Christopher Greenwood, “International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force:  Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and 
Iraq,” 4 San Diego Int’l L. J. 7, 34-36 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, “The Fall of Saddam Hussein:  Security 
Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense,” 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 576, 578-82 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, 
“Legal Authority Exists for a Strike on Iraq,” The Financial Times at 19 (Mar. 14, 2003).  For a sophisticated 
defense of the United States’ intervention (albeit one not keyed to the textual analysis of the relevant 
Resolutions), see Michael D. Ramsey, “Reinventing the Security Council: The U.N. as a Lockean System,” 
79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1529 (2004). 
48 For a recent critique of the U.S. legal position, see Byers, supra n.--, at 44-45; see also Simon Chesterman, 
“Just War or Just Peace After September 11:  Axes of Evil and Wars Against Terror in Iraq and Beyond,”  
37 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 281, 288-97 (2005).   For a survey of some objections, see Helen Duffy, The 
‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, supra n.--, at 201-02.   
49 Many of the pertinent legal objections are summarized in David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and 
Beyond:  Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention 127-39, 158-66 (2006).  See also Michael Glennon, 
Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power:  Interventionism After Kosovo, ch. 1 (2001); John C. Yoo, Using 
Force, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 729, 735 & n.22 (2004); Dinstein, supra note --, at 881; Jules Lobel, Benign 
Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 19 (2000); Bruno Simma, NATO, 
the UN and the Use of Force:  Legal Aspects, 10 European J. Int’l L. 1 (1999).  Despite setting out the legal 
case against intervention altogether flawlessly, Richard Falk attempts, unconvincingly in my view, to defend 
the legality of NATO’s actions under international law.  See Richard Falk, “Humanitarian Intervention After 
Kosovo,” in Aleksandar Jokie (ed.), Lessons of Kosovo:  The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention 31-52 
(2003).  Other efforts to find justification – even if retrospective – for the Kosovo intervention under 
international law include Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 831 (1999). 
50 Moreover, it seems fair to point out that even if the United States did violate the U.N. Charter’s restrictions 
on the use of force (Article 2(4) in particular) by attacking Iraq, that infraction was hardly unique in the 
Charter’s history.  In a classic article written thirty-six years ago, the international law scholar Thomas M. 
Franck pronounced Article 2(4) dead:  “today the high-minded resolve of Article 2(4) mocks us from its grave 
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What we should deduce from these four situations, I submit, is that the views of the 
United States and continental Europe on the place of international law in regulating State 
practice are not as sharply opposed as is often assumed.  Sometimes the differences, 
though real, prove on analysis to turn on policy rather than law.  And sometimes the 
conduct of the European nations, judged by the standards they would apply to the United 
States, is no better, or even worse, than American conduct.  True, we have not examined a 
host of other controversies that have arisen in recent years between Europe and the United 
States over international law, such as whether the United States could properly denounce 
the optional protocol to the Vienna Consular Convention that subjected it in cases under 
that treaty to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice [“ICJ”],51 or whether the 
United States was correct in concluding that Taliban captives taken in the Afghan conflict 
were not entitled as a matter of law to the status of prisoners of war under the Third 
Geneva Convention, or whether the United States is violating the Torture Convention or 
other international human rights treaties by its (asserted) practices in detaining al Qaeda or 
Taliban captives indefinitely, or by (assertedly) holding them in secret locations without 
visitation by the International Committee of the Red Cross, or in subjecting them to certain 
methods of interrogation, or in attempting to assassinate particular al Qaeda leaders.  
Again, no one could deny that these disagreements are real and substantial.  But in 
acknowledging them, we should also be careful not to reduce any characteristic differences 
there may be between the United States and Europe over international law to the 
moralizing simplicities of Maoist street theater.     
 
. . . [A]s with Ozymandias, only the words remain.”  Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 809, 809-10 (1970).       
51 See generally Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).  
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With those cautions taken, we shall go forward on the assumption that there are 
significant differences between the United States and at least some of its continental Allies, 
not only over the precise requirements of international law, but more importantly over the 
role international law should play in controlling State practice, especially in the “War on 
Terror.”  Let us briefly to survey the landscape -- from an altitude 30,000 feet above the 
earth.   
We may stipulate that the United States typically prefers a “positivistic” approach to 
questions of international law,52 tending to acknowledge no international legal duties or 
constraints upon its sovereignty except those that have arisen from its actual or express 
consent.53 This approach enables the United States to argue that it is not constrained by 
“customary law” (unless it has specifically endorsed or adopted it) or, still less, by jus 
cogens (a category of law that is purportedly binding even in the face of a State’s deliberate 
refusal to consent54). It also permits the United States to read its written treaty obligations 
 
52 A positivist view of international law rather than a natural law-based one has been characteristic of American 
jurisprudence since at least the post-Civil War period.  See Stephen M. Feldman, “From Premodern to 
Modern American Jurisprudence:  The Onset of Positivism,” 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1421-25 (1997); 
William S. Dodge, “The Story of the Paquete Habana: Customary International Law as Part of Our Law,”  
available at [SSRN], at 10-14.  
53 Although this tendency has deep roots in American jurisprudential and political traditions, it has surely 
been reinforced by the current “neo-conservative” ascendancy. See Fukuyama, supra n.--, at 49, 64-65.  
However, as Richard Pildes notes, the divergence between European and American understandings of the 
proper relationship between law and politics has been growing for at least the last generation.  See Richard H. 
Pildes, “Conflicts Between American and European Views of Law:  The Dark Side of Legalism,” 44 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 145, 146-47 (2003). 
54 The paradigmatic statement of the jus cogens concept is Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties, 
which provides that “[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law . . . from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99 (1969).  The ICJ has from time to time referred to 
particular norms as jus cogens.  See, e.g., Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 
Ltd, Second Phase, Belgium v. Spain, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 1970 WL 1, ¶¶ 33-34.  
Although it has antecedents that can be traced back to Roman law, see Egon Schwelb, ”Some 
Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission,” 61 Am. J. Int’l L. 
946, 948 (1967), the concept of jus cogens was hardly found in international law until the twentieth century.  
See generally George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., “Jus Cogens:  Root & Branch (An Inventory),” 3 Touro L. Rev. 
203, 207-12 (1986/87).  The concept was applied to treaties beginning in 1937.  See Alfred von Verdross, 
“Forbidden Treaties in International Law,” 31 Am. J. Int’l L. 571 (1937).   
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in a lawyerly – or, its critics would say, legalistic – way.   By contrast, the continental 
Europeans characteristically favor an approach to international law that encourages a 
willingness on the part of national sovereigns to submit their powers of unilateral decision-
making to consensual, intergovernmental arrangements, to construe their treaty obligations 
(especially in human rights and humanitarian law) broadly, to rely on and follow custom 
and, most interestingly of all, to assume that certain unwritten, natural law norms have a 
binding effect.  If this characterization is even roughly right, we could say (to borrow 
William James’s terms) that the United States is tough-minded about international law, and 
Europe is tender-minded about it.   What, then, explains these differences?  
I. 
 Rubenfeld’s starting-point is the claim that “the new international order that 
emerged after the Second World War had very different meanings in America and in 
Europe.”55 Grasping those different interpretations of the War is, he argues, “essential to 
understanding the phenomena of U.S. unilateralism and European internationalism 
today.”56 
Pondering the wreckage left by Nazism, war, genocide and defeat, Europeans, on 
this account, drew two fundamental lessons for their constitutional future.  The first 
concerned the evils of nationalism; the second, the risks of democracy. 
 First, nationalism.  Rubenfeld is undoubtedly right in stating that the end of the 
Second World War led to the decline of nationalism all over Western Europe, but above 
 
55 Rubenfeld, supra n.--, at 1985. 
56 Id.  See also Morgan, supra n.--, at 45 (“Fifty years ago – roughly at the time when the current process of 
European integration got going – very few people in European intellectual and scholarly circles had anything 
favorable to say about nationalism.  Conservatives disliked it because of its revolutionary potential to 
undermine existing state boundaries; socialists saw it as a threat to the international solidarity of workers; and 
liberals condemned it as a regressive form of collectivism.”).   
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all in Germany.57 As Russell Hittinger puts the point, “[i]n 1945, after two world wars, the 
crown jewel of modernity – the sovereign nation state – was brought before the bar of 
moral judgment.  The Protestant theologian, Karl Barth aptly called this the era of 
‘disillusioned sovereignty.’”58 One lasting effect of the aversion to nationalism has been the 
continuing drive toward closer European integration, leading to the creation in time of such 
supranational bodies as the European Union.59 Indeed, in the words of a former judge on 
 
57 Various causes might be assigned to the post-War decline of nationalism in Western Europe.  The political 
scientist John Mearsheimer attributes the decline partly to the active steps that the occupation forces in 
Germany took to dampen nationalism, and partly to the fact that since the European states had been relieved 
of the need to provide for their own security, they “lacked the incentive to purvey hyper-nationalism in order 
to bolster public support for national defense.”  John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future:  Instability in 
Europe after the Cold War,” reprinted in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven 
E. Miller (eds.), Theories of War and Peace 3, 27 (1998).  In addition, Mearsheimer also notes that strategic 
reliance on nuclear weapons to maintain the peace of Europe had the effect of “reducing the importance of 
mass armies for preserving sovereignty, thus diminishing the importance of maintaining a hyper-nationalized 
pool of manpower.  Id.; see generally Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles:  War, Peace, and the Course of 
History 190 (2002) (noting connection between emergence of nationalism and strategic need for mass 
armies).   
58 Russell Hittinger, “The Ethical Traditions of Europe and the USA:  Common Roots and Possibilities for 
Dialogue:  Comments on Yves Simon,” at 5 (Palermo, July 18-23, 2004), available at 
http://www.thomasinternational.org/conferences/200407118palermo/russell__paper.htm.
59 After the end of the Second World War, both European and American statesmen and diplomats favored a 
type of European federation that would forge close economic ties between Germany and its Western 
neighbors, thus at once preventing Communism from spreading to the West and averting the revival of 
German militarism.  See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, After Victory:  Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the 
Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars 182, 202-03, 207, 209-10 (2001).  The European Union [“EU”], 
established in 1993, see Treaty on European Union (The Treaty of Maastricht), entered into force 
November 1, 1993, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, O.J.C. C 340/173, November 10, 1997, 
originated in 1957 as the six-member European Economic Community in 1957, see Treaty Establishing the 
European Ecoomic Community (EEC), March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S., 4 Eur. Y.B. 412, as amended, which 
itself was the outgrowth of the 1951 Coal and Steel Community, see Treaty Establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S., as amended.  See Ernest A. Young, 
“Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union:  Some Cautionary Tales From American 
Federalism,” 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1612, 1621-36 (2002) (detailing origins of EU).  The formation of the EU is 
widely, and correctly, understood to have entailed the diminution of its Member States’ national sovereignty.  
See, e.g., George Sørensen, Changes in Statehood:  The Transformation of International Relations 87 (2001) 
(EU exemplifies “a new type of sovereign statehood . . . which is qualitatively different from the modern 
state”); Stephen D. Krasner, “The Hole in the Whole:  Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International 
Law,” 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1075, 1085 (2004) (“The member states of the EU have used their international 
legal sovereignty, their right to sign treaties, to create supranational institutions and pooled sovereignty 
arrangements that have compromised their Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty.  For instance, the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice have direct effect and supremacy in the legal systems of the member states.  
Thus, the member states of the EU are not juridically independent, even though this loss of independence is 
the result of freely chosen commitments.”).  European judicial institutions have recognized this fact:  “[b]y 
creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions . . . and, more particularly, real 
powers, . . . the Member States have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and 
themselves.”  Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.   EU Member States have now created a system of 
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the European Court of Justice, the guiding purpose of European integration has been “to 
prevent the evils of nationalism.”60 No longer would it be the fate of the European peoples 
to suffer from what Jean-Jacques Rousseau had called their “deadly intimacy;” no longer 
would it be the case that “the state peculiar to the Powers of Europe is simply a state of 
war.”61 Throughout the course of this extraordinary project, the EU and its precursors have 
used economic means not only to achieve greater efficiency and competitiveness and to 
promote intra-European trade,62 but even more fundamentally to secure deeper political 
integration.63 While the post-War phenomenon of the erosion of national feeling and 
national sovereignty has by no means been confined to Europe,64 it has, perhaps, been felt 
 
powerful supranational institutions, including the Council of Ministers (roughly, an executive); the European 
Commission (a centralized administrative bureaucracy);  a European Parliament; and the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.   
60 Manfred Zuleeg, “A Community of Law:  Legal Cohesion in the European Union,” 20 Fordham Int’l L. J. 
623, 623 (1997).   
61 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Extrait du projet perpetuelle de M. l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre,” quoted in Jonathan 
Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessity:  Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli 82 (2002). 
62 The same trends were, of course, powerful throughout the post-War developed world.  “Between 1972 and 
1991, it has been estimated, imports grew 65 percent more rapidly than home demand and exports grew 
twice as fast as the economy as a whole.  Neither multinational corporations nor the national economies in 
which they operated could therefore retreat from the global economy without forfeiting their ability to 
participate in the growth of world trade.   In consequence, governments began to back off from efforts to 
insulate their economies from competition and sought instead to prevail in the increasingly competitive 
environment.”  James E. Cronin, The World The Cold War Made:  Order, Chaos, and the Return of 
History 248 (1996).   
63 See Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism:  The World Economy in the 21st Century 193-96 
(2000); Robert J. Art, Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO, 111 Pol. Sc. Q. 1, 2 
(1996) (“The desire for security vis-à-vis one another has played a role in the Western European states’ 
second great push for closer union in the 1990s, just as it did during their first great push of the late 1940s 
and early 1950s.  In neither phase of Europe’s integration can economic considerations alone explain elite 
motivations.”).  The strategy of the EU’s architects – Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, Konrad Adenauer and 
(later) Jacques Delors -- “was to move incrementally with technical and economic measures designed to 
increasingly bring member states together in a seamless, interdependent, commercial web of relationships.  
Each small step of economic integration would result in a slight, sometimes imperceptible erosion of their 
national sovereignty.  None of the steps alone, they figured, would be enough to arouse the ire of member 
states and threaten the furtherance of the Union.  The upshot of this piecemeal strategy would be that ‘one 
day the national governments would awaken to finding themselves in a “spreading web of international 
activities and agencies” from which they would find it almost impossible to extricate themselves.’”  Jeremy 
Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream 
203-04 (pb. ed. 2005). 
64 No longer can it be asserted with confidence that “[m]odern man in general has shown a stronger loyalty to 
the state than to church or class or other international bond. . . .  [A] modern sovereign state . . . might almost 
be defined as the ultimate loyalty for which men today will fight.” Martin Wight, Power Politics 25 (Hedley 
Bull & Carsten Holbraad eds. 1978).  Rather, throughout much of the developed world, it appears that “[t]he 
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unusually keenly there.  In the United States, by contrast, nationalism remains powerful – 
some would say, too powerful.65 
Second, democracy.  Rubenfeld argues, rightly in my opinion, that post-War 
Europeans also viewed the Allied triumph as “a victory not only against nationalism, but 
[also] against popular sovereignty, against democratic excess.”66 However resistant we might 
be to accepting the claim that Nazism and Fascism were popular movements that achieved 
power through electoral victories, and that Hitler’s program of racism, nationalism, 
militarism, and conquest long enjoyed the broad support of the German people, a large 
body of historical writing beginning with Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1950) and J.R. Talmon’s 1952 study, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, has 
vindicated that understanding.67 
The trend in post-War European opinion to regard nationalism and popular 
sovereignty mistrustfully, even anxiously, has led to profound changes in European 
constitutional law.  Consider, for example, the German Constitution of May 23, 1949 – the 
Grundgesetz or “Basic Law.” 68 Three fundamental innovations made by this Constitution 
deserve notice here.   
First, the Grundgesetz begins with a series of nineteen articles enumerating basic 
individual rights and thus emphasizing their centrality in the post-War German régime.
nation-state faces . . . a double crisis, both of rationality, whereby the state cannot adequately perform its 
traditional functions, and of legitimation, whereby the state is unable as a consequence to rely on mass 
loyalties.”  Mathew Horsman & Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State 219 (1994).   
65 See, e.g., Anatol Lieven America Right or Wrong:  An Anatomy of American Nationalism (2004). 
66 Rubenfeld, supra, at 1986.   
67 See, e.g., Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence:  Democratization and the Nationalist Conflict (2000); 
Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” 49 World Politics 3 (1997) 
(attributing much of Nazi political success to strength rather than weakness of German civil society). See 
generally Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” 76 For. Aff. 22 (1997).  A controversial 
explanation of the nexus between Nazism and popular feeling is found in D.J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners:  Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996).  Goldhagen’s account is examined critically in 
Fritz Stern, The Goldhagen Controversy:  One Nation, One People, One Theory?, 75 For. Aff. 128 (1996). 
68 Although the illustration is my own, I believe it helps to crystallize Professor Rubenfeld’s analysis. 
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Indeed, Article 1 (“Protection of human dignity”) insists upon the universality of human 
rights:  in sweeping language, it posits that “[t]he dignity of man is inviolable.  To respect 
and protect it is the duty of all state authority. . . .  The German people therefore 
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of 
peace and justice in the world.”   In emphasizing the centrality of human dignity, the 
Framers of the Grundgesetz “were well aware that [it] had been utterly trampled by the 
Nazis.”69 Breaking with the main traditions of German jurisprudence, the Grundgesetz 
“does not regard the state as the source of fundamental rights.  The core of individual 
freedom, like human dignity itself, is anterior to the state.”70 
Second, equally if not more innovative was the so-called “eternity clause” in Article 
79(3), which set forth that “the basic principles laid down in Article[] 1” were 
unamendable, along with the guarantees in Article 20 that Germany was to be “a 
democratic and social federal state,” that political authority derived from the “people” and 
was exercised at elections, and that executive, legislative and judicial powers were to be 
separated.71 As Professor Peter Lindseth’s masterful recent study in The Yale Law Journal 
of German and French constitutionalism points out, Article 79(3), while affirming the 
democratic nature of the German state, was also designed to limit democratic majorities 
and even super-majorities:   “[t]he purpose of Article 79(3) was to prevent a momentary 
political majority (following the practice of the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic) from 
authorizing the executive or any other body to abrogate the separation of powers or 
 
69 David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 11 (1994). 
70 Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 41 (2d ed. 
1997). 
71 See Id. at 48 (“One doctrine that has emerged . . . is the concept of the unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment.  The doctrine holds that even a constitutional amendment would be unconstitutional were it to 
conflict with the core values or spirit of the Basic Law as a whole. . . . The Constitutional Court accepted the 
concept of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment as valid doctrine in the Article 117 case (1953).” 
27
constitutionally protected rights, even if that majority was of a sufficient magnitude to 
amend the constitution in order to grant such power.”72 
Third, Articles 92 and 93 of the Grundgesetz  established a Federal Constitutional 
Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, that was to act of the final guarantor of constitutional 
rights.  These provisions eradicated any doubt that had existed under earlier law whether 
the courts could enforce the provisions of the organic law against the legislature, the 
executive, or even “the People.”73 
Professor Rubenfeld argues, persuasively I believe, that the kind of thinking about 
human dignity, popular sovereignty and the limits of State power that shaped the 
Grundgesetz carries inescapable implications for views of international law.74 In particular, 
a jurisprudence of this kind will be open to, resemble, or even expressly affirm natural law 
and, in doing so, will inevitably make universal claims about human rights and the limits of 
State power such as those found in Article 1 of the Grundgesetz. Natural law thinking 
unquestionably influenced post-War European constitutionalism deeply, through the 
writings of the French Roman Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain and other lesser-
known natural law theorists, as well as through the constitution-building activities of such 
prominent Catholic political figures as Konrad Adenauer.75 Although arguably not a 
consistent natural law theorist himself, Germany’s most influential post-War 
 
72 Peter L. Lindseth, “The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy:  Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship 
in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s,” 113 Yale L. J. 1341, 1388 (2004) (emphasis added). 
73 See Currie, supra n.--, at 5 (discussing judicial review under Weimar Constitution); id. at 171-72 (discussing 
judicial review under Grundgesetz). 
74 Other scholars have, of course, noted the close historical connection between the atrocities of the Nazi 
period and the rise of a new international law.  Michael Ignatieff, for example, has observed, with regard to 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), “without the Holocaust, then, no 
Declaration.”  Ignatieff sees the Declaration as “a studied attempt to reinvent the European natural law 
tradition.”  Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, 66, 81 (2001). 
75 See Edward M. Andries, “On the German Constitution’s Fiftieth Anniversary:  Jacques Maritain and the 
1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz),” 13 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1, 37-43 (1999). 
28
jurisprudentialist, Gustav Radbruch, expressed this tendency forthrightly when he wrote in 
his first work after the War: 
There are, therefore, principles of law that are stronger than any statute, so that a 
law conflicting with these principles is devoid of validity.  One calls these principles 
the natural law or the law of reason.  To be sure, their details remain somewhat 
doubtful, but the work of centuries has established a solid core of them and they 
have come to enjoy such a far-reaching consensus in the declarations of human and 
civil rights that only the deliberate skeptic can still entertain doubts about some of 
them.[76]
Given this constitutional culture, with its grounding in natural law doctrines and its 
mistrust of both nationalism and the belief in popular sovereignty that often accompanies it, 
we should expect to find, as Rubenfeld says, that the “dominant European understanding 
today” is that “the fundamental point of international law, and particularly of international 
human rights law, [i]s to check national sovereignty, emphatically including national 
popular sovereignty.”77 Accordingly, as he says, “[i]nternational law enjoys a kind of 
higher-law status throughout much of Europe . . . .  It is, for many, a form of constitutional 
law – a body of supreme law authorized to override all other laws and governmental 
decisions.”78 
The passage from constitutional law to international law is mediated by the concept 
of universality: as Rubenfeld explains, constitutional rights can be understood (as in 
 
76 Quoted in Heather Leawoods, “Gustav Radbruch:  An Extraordinary Legal Philosopher,” 2 Wash. U. J. L. 
& Pol’y 489, 496 (2000).  Radbruch’s post-War views on natural and positive law “occasioned a massive 
debate [in Germany] in the late forties and fifties on natural law.”  Peter Caldwell, “Legal Positivism and 
Weimar Democracy,” 39 Am. J. Juris. 273, 274 (1994).  See also Markus Dirk Dubber, “Judicial Positivism 
and Hitler’s Injustice,” 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1807, 1807-08 (1993) (“In 1945, Gustav Radbruch, perhaps the 
most influential German legal philosopher in this century, spent the remaining years before his death in 1949 
renouncing positivism and calling for the recognition of law beyond positive statutory law (übergesetzliches 
Recht).  In the first decade or so after 1945, German courts, including the German Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichthof) and the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) often invoked 
Radbruch’s endorsement of a limited role for supra-legal concepts and displayed much hostility toward ‘the 
attitude of an anormative legal positivism (wertungsfreien Gesetzespositivismus) . . . which legal science and 
practice ha[ve] overcome some time ago.’”). 
77 Rubenfeld, supra n.--, at 1986. 
78 Id. at 1991.      
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Germany) as universal:  “They are rights people have by nature, by virtue of being persons, 
by reason of morality, or by reason of Reason itself.  Constitutional principles . . . possess 
an authority superior to that of politics, including, of course, democratic politics.  This 
special authority, residing in a normative domain higher than that of politics, is what allows 
constitutional law properly to displace the outcomes of political decisionmaking, including 
democratic decisionmaking.”79 Constitutional principles, so conceived, cannot be tied to 
specific nations, peoples, cultures or traditions; they are not contingent elements of some 
(but not other) national legal régimes.   “On this view, constitutional principles and 
structures ought in principle to be supra-national.  Constitutional rights transcend national 
boundaries.  Constitutional principles are superior to claims of national sovereignty or self-
determination.”80 
These characteristics of European constitutional culture, although admirable in 
many respects, can also generate considerable friction with non-European nations that do 
not comply with Europe’s purportedly universal standards.  An obvious example is the 
American (state and federal) death penalty.  Although opposition to the death penalty is 
reflected in a variety of international human rights conventions,81 the most vehement 
criticism comes from European governments, courts and publics.82 Former U.S. 
 
79 Rubenfeld, supra n.--, at 1991-92. 
80 Id. at 1992. 
81 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 6 I.L.M. 368 
(1967), entered into force March 23, 1976; Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, E.T.S. No. 
114, entered into force March 3, 1985.  On the other hand, “[n]o human rights convention abolishes the 
death penalty,” and “it is difficult to argue that customary international law contains a rule prohibiting the 
death penalty.”  John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, “Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights,” 
92 Am. J. Int’l L. 187, 196 (1998). 
82 Although there is a widespread international consensus against the death penalty, negative sentiment seems 
to be particularly strong among European élites.  (Public opinion in leading European countries had 
supported the death penalty at the time of abolition.)  See Carol S. Steiker, “Capital Punishment and 
American Exceptionalism,” 81 Or. L. Rev. 97, 109 (2002).   European hostility to the death penalty may stem 
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Ambassador to France Felix Rohatyn has observed that “no single issue evoked as much 
passion and as much protest as executions in the United States. . . [S]ome 300 million of 
our closest allies think capital punishment is cruel and unusual and it might be worthwhile 
to give it some further thought.”83 Dean Harold Koh and Ambassador Thomas Pickering 
have warned that “[f]or a country that aspires to be a world leader on human rights, the 
death penalty has become our Achilles’ heel.”84 “Since 1998, the European Union has 
intervened repeatedly in U.S. executions through clemency appeals or by conveying its 
abolitionist views directly to local legislators.”85 There is even some evidence that the death 
penalty is damaging joint U.S.-European counter-terrorism efforts.86 
European judicial decisions reflect the same implacable and (some would say) 
excessive hostility to the U.S. death penalty.  For example, in 1989, the European Court of 
Human Rights held in Soering v. United Kingdom, (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439, that it would 
violate Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms,87 which states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” if the United Kingdom extradited a 
German national to the United States to stand trial on a capital charge in the State of 
Virginia.  Although the Court acknowledged that the Convention itself allowed for capital 
punishment in certain circumstances (id., ¶ 101), it held that the circumstances to which the 
 
from a variety of historically contingent causes, including Europe’s recent experiences of massive state-
sanctioned violence and persisting ethnic conflicts.  Id. at 126.   
83 Quoted in Mark Warren, “Death, Dissent and Diplomacy:  The U.S. Death Penalty as an Obstacle to 
Foreign Relations,” 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 309, 313 (2004).  See also Felix G. Rohatyn, “Dead to the 
world,” The International Herald Tribune at 8 (Jan. 27, 2006). 
84 Id. at 315 (quoting Harold Hongju Koh & Thomas Pickering, “American Diplomacy and the Death 
Penalty:  For a Country That Aspires to be a World Leader in Human Rights, the Death Penalty Has 
Become Our Achilles’ Heel,” Foreign Serv. J., Oct. 2003, at 9, 20-25).   
85 Id. at 318. 
86 See A. John Radsan, “The Massaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota,” 31 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1417, 
1440 (2005).   
87 E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, entered into force September 3, 1953.  
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applicant would be exposed as a death row inmate in Virginia, including the likely 6 to 8 
year delay he would face as his appeals ran, would in themselves pose “a real risk of 
treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3” (id., ¶ 111).   The Court allowed 
that “[t]he length of time awaiting death is . . . in a sense largely of the prisoner’s own 
making in that he takes advantage of all avenues of appeal which are offered to him by 
Virginia law, id., ¶ 106; and it also conceded that “[t]he democratic character of the 
Virginia legal system in general and the positive features of the Virginia trial, sentencing and 
appeal procedures in particular are beyond doubt.”  Id., ¶ 111.  Nonetheless, even the use 
of the extradition process to enable Virginia to try the applicant was considered to be a 
serious human rights violation.88 
Summarizing the dominant European position, Jeremy Rifkin writes: 
No issue more unites Europeans than the question of capital punishment.  For 
them, opposition to the death penalty is as deeply felt as opposition to slavery was 
for the American abolitionists of the nineteenth century.  Indeed, for a society so 
used to muting its passions, Europeans express a raw emotional disgust of capital 
punishment that is not evident anywhere else in the world.  Whenever a prisoner 
on death row in the United States is executed, it is barely noticed in America but 
elicits vehement protest across Europe.  Make no mistake about it:  Europeans are 
the abolitionists of the twenty-first century, and they are determined to evangelize 
the world and will not rest until capital punishment is abolished across the Earth.[89]
88 Other European national courts have been influenced by Soering. See, e.g., The Netherlands v. Short, HR 
30 Mar. 1990, NJ 249 (A.H.J. Swart), excerpted and translated in 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990).  On the other hand, 
the Canadian Supreme Court arrived at a markedly dissimilar conclusion in Kindler v. Crosbie, [1991] 2 
S.C.R., where it upheld the constitutionality under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of the 
Canadian Minister of Justice’s decision, pursuant to the extradition treaty between Canada and the United 
States, to extradite a U.S. national who had been tried and found guilty of a capital offense in Pennsylvania 
and who had escaped to Canada before sentencing.  Justice La Forest’s judgment examined the same “death 
row phenomenon” that had persuaded the European Court of Human Rights, but noted that the 
phenomenon was largely the effect of a “generous appeal process,” and observed that “[w]hile the 
psychological stress inherent in the death row phenomenon cannot be dismissed lightly, it ultimately pales in 
comparison to the death penalty.  Besides, the fact remains that a defendant is never forced to undergo the 
full appeal procedure . . .   It would be ironic if delay caused by the appellant’s taking advantage of the full 
and generous avenue of the appeals available to him should be viewed as a violation of fundamental justice.”  
Id. at 838.  
89 Rifkin, supra n.--, at 84. 
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So much, then, for European attitudes toward international law, the sources in 
European constitutionalism from which they derive, and the aggressive universalism that 
they sometimes exhibit.  What, by contrast, of the characteristic American view of 
international law?  Certainly our dominant jurisprudence does not accord international 
law the privileged status of the Constitution itself; indeed, other than treaties that the 
United States has ratified and that are interpreted to permit judicial enforcement, the 
place of international law in American jurisprudence has been somewhat problematic.90 
Moreover, the American “unilateralism” that Rubenfeld is seeking to explain is clearly 
inimical to the European vision of international law, as he describes it.  On the other 
hand, American legal and constitutional thinking, like that of post-War Europe, has a 
decidedly “universalist” turn.91 And throughout most of the post-War period, the United 
States has been the world’s most influential proponent of international law.  One need 
only glance at the structural features of the United Nations Charter – a Security Council, 
General Assembly and ICJ paralleling the American Executive, Congress and Supreme 
 
90 See, e.g., Andrea Bianchi, “International Law and U.S. Courts:  The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited,” 15 
Euro. J. Int’l L. 751 (2004). 
91 As Rubenfeld observes, “Americans have at times been the most aggressive proponents of international 
constitutionalism, seeking to disseminate or impose (American) constitutional principles around the world, 
without much concern about whether these principles reflect other nations’ self-given commitments.”  
Rubenfeld, supra n.--, at 1994.   
An instructive recent example of the American tendency to export our own constitutional values is 
found in the case of the new Iraqi Constitution.  The United States attempted to use its military, diplomatic 
and political leverage to induce the Iraqis to adopt a Constitution that would reflect American (rather than 
indigenous Iraqi) traditions and values in various ways. In particular, the United States was anxious that the 
new Iraqi Constitution not accord too prominent a place to Islam.  The U.S.-drafted Interim Constitution 
therefore included in Article 7 only bare and abstract language stating that “Islam . . . to be considered a 
source of legislation.”  Further, Article 7 stated that while the Constitution “respects the religious identity of 
the majority of the Iraqi people,” it merely “guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of 
religious belief and practice.”  Iraqi Prime Minister Ja’fari and other Iraqi leaders sought to establish a more 
secure constitutional place for Islam. Their view prevailed.  The Iraqi Constitution, as approved by the voters 
of that country on October 15, 2002, states in Sec. I, Art. 2, that “Islam . . . is a fundamental source of 
legislation” (emphasis added).  Further, Sec. I, art. 2 does not merely “respect” the Islamic identity of the 
Iraqi majority but “guarantees” it.  Finally, protection nof religious liberty and practice is guaranteed to all 
individuals . . . such as Christians, Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans” (id.) (emphasis added).  See generally 
Kristen Stilt, “Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System,”36 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 695 (2004).  
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Court – or at the human rights provisions of the United Nations Covenants – paralleling 
the American Bill of Rights – to see in these foundational documents that fine American 
hand at work.92 How can these apparently contradictory strains of thought be reconciled? 
 Rubenfeld’s explanation of the American case proceeds at two levels:  through a 
description of the American constitutional self-understanding, and through an account of 
the American interpretation of the Nation’s enormous victories in the Second World War.           
 First, American constitutionalism is, in its own eyes, “democratic.”  The 
American Constitution (on this understanding) has been made (and over time, re-made) 
through “national democratic processes.”93 American constitutional law has thus enabled 
the American people “to make their own fundamental law – to decide for themselves on 
the enduring legal and political commitments that will govern the polity in the future.”94 
Although America’s constitutional commitments “will include fundamental rights that 
stand against majority rule at any given moment” and are thus “counter-majoritarian,” 
they are not therefore “counter-democratic.”95 Rather, they are democratic because “they 
represent the nation’s self-given law, enacted through a special, democratic, 
constitutional politics, subject to democratic amendment processes in the future.”96 
Because “democratic constitutionalism is much more deeply ingrained in American 
thought and practice (concerning our own constitutional law) than it is in contemporary 
European thought and practice (concerning international law),” Americans will view 
 
92 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, “Rights:  American and Human,” 79 Colum. L. Rev. 405, 415 (1979) (“[T]he 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
are in their essence American constitutional rights projected around the world.”). 
93 Rubenfeld, supra n.--, at 1993. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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international law very differently from Europeans.97 While Americans regard their 
fundamental law as “made by the people,” they cannot possibly view international law in 
the same light:  international law has been made “in response to the most cataclysmic 
expression of ‘popular will’ the world had ever known.”98 
These characteristic American narratives of the diverse origins of constitutional 
law and international law also help to explain America’s post-War “equivocation on 
international law.”99 In stark contrast to the defeated Europeans, Americans interpreted 
the successful outcome of the Second World War as “a victory for nationalism – for our 
nation, for our kind of nationalism,” and as “a victory for popular sovereignty (our 
sovereignty) and a victory for democracy (our democracy).”100 The remedies that we 
proposed or approved for a vanquished Europe – an internationalism that would bridle 
nationalism, a constitutionalism that would check popular sovereignty – were neither 
necessary nor useful for us.   In remodeling Europe and establishing the new, post-War 
world order, we were refashioning the continent and the globe in our own image:  “when 
drafting international human rights treaties, founding the United Nations and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), imposing constitutions on Germany and Japan, and pushing 
Europe toward integration, Americans were able to see themselves as laboring 
generously, for the sake of people everywhere, to make the world more American.”101 
But simply because we were (as we saw it) Americanizing the world through the 
construction of a new world order, we would not ourselves be bound by all its dictates:  
“in the American view, all this internationalism, all this multilateralism, was more for the 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1989. 
100 Id. at 1986. 
101 Id. at 1987-88. 
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rest of the world than it was for us . . . .  From the beginning, Americans imagined 
international law applying to the world, but not applying – or not applying in exactly the 
same way – to America.”102 
Such, then, is Rubenfeld’s theory in outline.  Its brilliance is obvious and its 
explanatory power, incontestable.  The historical narrative upon which it is based – even if 
one might quarrel with it at the margins103 – is broadly true and illuminating. Most of all, 
 
102Id. at 1988-89. Andrew Moravcsik arrives at similar conclusions by Rubenfeld’s here, but by a different 
analytic route.  See Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:  Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe,” 54 International Organization 217 (2000) (finding that while “new” post-War democracies 
such as Germany and Italy strongly supported international human rights regimes such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, established democracies such as Great Britain did not, and seeking to explain 
these differences by arguing that the “new” democracies sought to “lock in” protections against the potential 
triumph of popular extremist parties, whereas established democracies believed they faced no such internal 
political risks).    
103 Rubenfeld’s argument may overemphasize the extent to which the post-War United States was unwilling to 
accept that its international human rights commitments required it to make changes in its domestic law – 
especially with regard to racial segregation; equally, he may fail to acknowledge the extent to which European 
nations, in the process of post-War decolonization, refused to honor their international legal obligations.   
On the first point, Rubenfeld rightly notes that U.S. State Dep’t Circular No. 175 (Dec. 13, 1955), 
strenuously resisted the idea that international treaty obligations could entail changes in our domestic law.  
Equally, one might note, the Supreme Court declined to puff the breath of life into Justice Black’s, Douglas’ 
and Murphy’s early suggestion that the U.N. Charter would necessitate changes in our racial laws, see Oyama 
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647-50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring); and 
other courts swiftly foreclosed the possibility of private enforcement of such treaty obligations, see Sei Fujii v. 
State, 38 Cal.2d 718 (1952).  Nonetheless, Russell Hittinger is right to say that “[m]ost Europeans do not 
appreciate how profoundly the American constitution was revised in response to the crisis of the 1930s and 
1940s.”  Hittinger, supra n.--, at 5.  Under the pressure of arguments by the Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations that the Nation’s foreign policy needs required that the Supreme Court dismantle State-
sponsored racial segregation, the Court did so with greater and great boldness.  See Robert J. Delahunty & 
Antonio F. Perez, “Moral Communities or A Market State:  The Supreme Court’s Vision of the Police 
Power in the Age of Globalization,” 42 Houston L. Rev. 637, 669-75 (2005).  If the Court’s decisions were 
not explicitly founded on international human rights agreements, they certainly reflected the post-War forces 
that had called such agreements into being. 
 Conversely, Rubenfeld’s argument ignores European disregard for the United Nations and for 
international human rights law during the wars of decolonization that followed the Second World War, such 
as the War in Algeria.  During the latter conflict, for instance, France argued strenuously that the United 
Nations General Assembly had no competence to consider the situation in Algeria, which France contended 
was a matter “essentially within [its] domestic jurisdiction” within the meaning of Art. 2(7) of the United 
Nations Charter.  Indeed, after the General Assembly decided to take up the question of Algeria, the French 
delegation left the Assembly and, for a period, it appeared that France might withdraw from the United 
Nations.  See Thomas Oppermann, Le problème algérien:  données historiques, politiques, juridiques 256 
(1961).  
The French conduct of the war in Algeria was also marked by grave human rights violations.  The 
disclosures by General Paul Aussarèsses of official complicity by leading French political figures in the 
Army’s use of torture during the war in Algeria brought on a major scandal in France.   See Paul Aussarèsses, 
The Battle of the Casbah:  Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 (pb. ed. 2005); see also 
General Aussarèsses’ interview in Le Monde after the publication of his book, available at The Project on 
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perhaps, it is persuasive in explaining why the differences between the United States and 
Europe over international law seem to be so intractable and so passionately felt. Europe’s 
“international constitutionalism,” as Rubenfeld calls it – the insistence that the particular 
rights and structures embedded in European constitutions are universal in nature, and not 
the contingent outcomes of specific national histories, is likely to make disagreements with 
the United States (and other non-European powers) harder to resolve.  Universalism, alas, 
is inherently liable to become belligerent -- to demand that human rights and immunities 
from State power, as it conceives them, must be realized everywhere.104 Illustrative of this 
tendency is the 2004 Barcelona Report, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, which 
was presented to Javier Solana.  The Report recommends that the “European Union’s 
security policy should be built on human security and not only on state security.  Human 
security means individual freedom from basic insecurities. . . .  A human security approach 
for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every 
individual human being and not focus only on the defense of the Union’s borders, as was 
 
Soldier Testimony & Human Rights, http://soldiertestimony.org/France_A1Document.2004-03-01.3817.
However, the French political leadership, governmental bureaucracy, intellectuals and even wider public were 
well aware through the 1950s of the Army’s practices.  For example, after allegations of torture were raised in 
the National Assembly in 1955 and all but confirmed by François Mitterand, then Minister of the Interior, 
the French government commissioned a report from a high-ranking colonial official, Roger Wuillaume, on 
the use of torture in Algeria.  Wuillaume’s report (for limited government circulation) not only acknowledged 
the use of torture, but also recommended sanctioning it as effective and indispensable.  See Gil Merom, How 
Democracies Lose Small Wars:  State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and 
the United States in Vietnam 112-13 (2003).  Public criticisms of the Army reached a high-water mark in 
1957, during the Battle of Algiers, but subsided thereafter, largely because the charges had lost their power to 
shock.  Writing in her journal in “this sinister month of December 1961,” Simone De Beauvoir said that she 
like many others was “suffer[ing] from a kind of tetanus of the imagination . . . One gets used to it.  In 1957, 
the burns in the face, on the sexual organs, the nails torn out, the empalements, the shrieks, the convulsions, 
outraged me.”  Quoted in John Talbott, The War Without a Name:  France in Algeria, 1954-1962 at 93 
(1980).  
104 See Hittinger, supra n.--, at 6 (discussing what Yves Simon calls “belligerent universalism”).  Zygmont 
Bauman considers it to be “an integral trait of European identity” to “presume[]” Europe’s values to be 
“universal, all-human; the distinctive feature of European values is to believe that values ‘make sense’ only if 
seen as all-inclusive, and are indefensible unless applied to all humanity.”  Bauman, supra n.--, at 125.    
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the security approach of nation-states.”105 A “Human Security Response Force” is 
proposed to execute this task.106 International law is construed to give the European Union 
“not only a right, but also a legal obligation to concern [itself] with human security 
worldwide.”107 If the European nationalism of the past threatened the peace, the European 
universalism of the future bids fair to do the same.   
The explanatory success of Rubenfeld’s theory on these very points, however, also 
exposes some vulnerability in it:  his analysis seems weakest in explaining why the 
European and American sides should also be willing to compromise their differences over 
international law -- as indeed they are.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to bridge over 
differences that arise from alleged violations of fundamental human rights whose existence 
owes nothing to purely national law and which it is imperative that every State respect.  On 
the other hand, disagreements over national interests are intrinsically negotiable:  reaching 
accommodations over them is the very stuff of diplomacy.     For that reason, if no other, 
Rubenfeld’s theory must be measured against a theory that is based on a conflict, not of 
values, but of interests. 
II. 
 Many observers have noted in recent years that the United States and its major 
Cold War allies are drifting apart.  And, as Professor John Mearsheimer has written, 
“[t]his trend is most apparent in Europe, where NATO’s 1999 war against Serbia and its 
messy aftermath have damages transatlantic relations and prompted the European Union 
to begin building a military force of its own that can operate independently of NATO – 
 
105 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe:  The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security 
Capabilities, Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana at 
9 (Sept. 16, 2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.cercle.lu/article.php3?id_article=588.
106 Id. at 22. 
107 Id. at 10. 
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which means independently of the United States.  The United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Italy are slowly but inexorably realizing that they want to provide for their 
own security and control their own destiny.  They are less willing to take orders from the 
United States than they were during the Cold War.”108 Mearsheimer’s words, which 
were written before September 11 and the Second Gulf War, are certainly far truer now.  
In a study published last year, Professor Robert Lieber observed that “it is by no means 
excessive to ask whether the United States and Europe may now be on the verge of a 
divorce in which their alliance of more than half a century collapses or they even become 
great power rivals.”109 Statements by European leaders have underscored a growing 
sense of competition and estrangement.  Romano Prodi, the former head of the European 
Commission, has said that one of the chief goals of the EU is to create “a superpower on 
the European continent that stands equal to the United States.”110 Jacques Chirac, the 
President of France, has said that “we need a means to struggle against American 
hegemony.”111 A French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, echoed Chirac by saying, 
“We cannot accept . . . the unilateralism of a single hyperpower.”112 European public 
opinion, as surveyed by the Pew Research Center, is deeply unfavorable to the United 
States.113 Josef Joffe, the publisher-editor of Die Zeit and no friend of European anti-
Americanism, concludes that if the post-modern States of Western Europe have any 
 
108 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 391 (2001). 
109 Robert J. Lieber, The American Era:  Power and Strategy For the 21st Century 62 (2005).  See also 
Fukuyama, supra n.--, at 103-13 (2006) (discussing sources of estrangement between U.S. and much of the 
rest of the world, including Europe). 
110 Quoted in id. at 62. 
111 Quoted in id.  
112 Quoted in id. at 67. 
113 See “America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns About Iran, Hamas,” Pew Global Attitudes 
Project (June 13, 2006), available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252. For example, 
only 43% of the French public, 41% of the German, and 23% of the Spanish, expressed positive views of the 
United States.   
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“common identity, it defines itself in opposition to the United States – both its culture and 
its clout.”114 And European intellectuals like Zygmont Bauman utterly seethe with 
resentment at the American hegemony.  In Europe:  An Unfinished Adventure, Bauman 
complains that until recently, Europe had never lived 
in the shadow of a power mightier than itself, more ambitious and resourceful in 
its resolve to set its own ambitions as standards for everyone else’s practice, and 
so also of holding such imported/imposed standards up to its own practice as the 
pattern to follow.  Europe had never faced the threat of being conquered by 
another continent – and never before had it been looked at from on high and 
denigrated as a second-rate power obliged to swear allegiance to a foreign empire 
and ingratiate itself to an alien force it had so little hope of mitigating, pacifying, 
or converting to its own ways – let alone of subduing it and subordinating it to its 
will.  Never had Europe lived with a demeaning awareness of its own inferiority 
and with the experience of being obliged to look up to patterns of life preached 
and practiced by others, of struggling to adjust and adapt its own acts to such 
patterns, of emulating alien forms of life and/or matching them by raising its 
forms of life to their level.[115]
Plainly, post-Cold War Western Europe feels deep misgivings about the fact of 
the United States’ global hegemony.  These misgivings have two main sources:  one is 
that the United States will underplay that role, and the other is that it will overplay it.   
Take the first fear:  disengagement.  American dissatisfaction with the operational 
complications in the Kosovo War that we attributed to NATO’s cumbersome consultative 
arrangements fed European fears that we might gradually disengage from our NATO 
commitments.116 Further, although the United States was eventually persuaded to enter 
 
114 Josef Joffe, Überpower:  The Imperial Temptation of America 123 (2006). 
115 Bauman, supra n.--, at 45.  Bauman sees a way forward, however, that will both overturn American 
hegemony and involve Europe in a planetary mission civilatrice: Europe, which itself is already moving 
“towards the Kantian world of perpetual peace, in which law, negotiation and cooperation gain the upper 
hand where violence and raw force once ruled,” is now “well prepared if not to lead, then most certainly to 
show the way from the Hobbesian planet to the Kantian ‘universal unification of the human species.’”  Id. at 
40.  
116 These fears were exacerbated when the United States decided, on the basis of its experience in the Kosovo 
War, not to conduct its 2002 campaign in Afghanistan as a NATO operation.  See Lieber, supra n.--, at 68.  
The Bush Administration believed that the desire to work multilaterally through NATO in Kosovo had tied 
American hands.  See Fukuyama, supra n.--, at 99.   For example, French President Chirac had stated on 
French television that “[n]ot a single air strike – and there were about 22,000 of them – was carried out 
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the war for Kosovo, its reluctance to do so could hardly have been greater:  Americans 
and their political leaders were beginning to insist that a wealthy and democratic Europe 
should guard its own house and fight its own wars:  thus, the Senate unanimously passed 
a resolution “bemoaning the ‘significant shortcomings’ in European defense capabilities 
and urging the European Union to rectify the ‘overall imbalance’ within the Atlantic 
Alliance.”117 Fear of American disengagement after the Kosovo War in turn led 
European leaders to create the European Union Rapid Reaction Force in December, 1999, 
and provided the backdrop for the establishment of the European Defense Agency 
[EDA], an EU armed force independent of NATO, in July, 2004.  Among other purposes, 
the EDA could serve one function that NATO has:  that of keeping the peace on the 
European continent by preventing conflict, not only between the Western European 
powers and the Russians, but also among the Western European powers themselves.118 
NATO has done that, most obviously, by ensuring that the United States would throw its 
full military weight on the side of any NATO member that was attacked (including by 
another NATO member).119 But NATO has also achieved that end by making the 
military strength, capabilities and intentions of each of the major Western European allies 
 
without France’s approval . . . When France objected, the strikes were not carried out.”  Quoted in “Chirac 
Says He Spared the Bridges,” The Washington Post at A 17 (June 11, 1999).  Other NATO allies objected 
to attacking one of Slobodan Milosevic’s residences because it housed a painting by Rembrandt; and Italy 
asked for an Easter bombing moratorium so that tourism in Venice would not be injured.  See Roger W. 
Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare:  Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power 57 (2003).   
117 Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era:  U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 
Twenty-First Century 64 (pb. ed. 2005) (citing S. Res. 208, Nov. 8, 1999). 
118 See Art, supra n.--, at 3 (“Western Europe’s drive to create a European Defense Identity (EDI) . . . was 
motivated by three elite worries:  fears about the power of a newly reunited Germany; concern that the 
United States might leave Europe now that the Cold War had ended; and as a consequence of the first two, 
the nightmare that Europe might revert to its destructive nationalistic past unless corrective steps were 
taken.”).  
119 See Mearsheimer, supra n.--, at 45 (“America’s hegemonic position in NATO . . . mitigated the effects of 
anarchy on the Western democracies and facilitated cooperation among them . . . [S]tates do not trust each 
other in anarchy and they have incentives to commit aggression against each other.  America, however, not 
only provided protection against the Soviet threat, but also guaranteed that no EC state would aggress against 
another.  For example, France did not have to fear Germany as it rearmed, because the American presence 
in Germany meant that the Germans were not free to attack anyone.”).    
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utterly transparent to each of the others. The Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey, in 
his classic study The Causes of War, argued persuasively for the thesis that “[w]ars 
usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength.”120 Certainly there is 
abundant evidence that ignorance of each others’ capabilities or uncertainty about its 
purposes can draw potential belligerents into actual hostilities.121 The NATO Alliance 
has reduced the risks of European conflict by ensuring that the French, German and 
British militaries would so interpenetrate each other that such ignorance or uncertainty 
would be impossible.  If America were induced to withdraw from NATO and if, as a 
result, the Alliance were to disintegrate, such transparency might disappear, and the risks 
of an intra-European war would be correspondingly heightened.  The Europeans may be 
contemplating an integrated EU military as an alternative to NATO, not so much because 
they fear the Americans, but because they fear one another.122 The problem with 
 
120 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War 293 (3d ed. 1988).   
121 See id. at 115-24; 241-42.  By the same logic, transparency can prevent war.  See Stephen Van Evera, 
Causes of War:  Power and the Roots of Conflict 137-42 (1999) (adducing historical evidence that military 
secrecy contributes to likelihood of war, while openness diminishes risks). “Transparency . . . allays 
suspicions.  It is because the United States was able to fully inform both India and Pakistan about each 
other’s military preparations in 1989 that it was able to convince both countries not to drift into war – which 
would undoubtedly have been nuclear.”  Philippe Delmas, The Rosy Future of War 226 (1995).  As the great 
theorist of war, von Clausewitz, saw, in a world of perfect information and rational choices, “one would never 
really need to use the physical strength of the fighting forces – comparative figures of their strength would be 
enough.  That would be a kind of war by algebra.”  Carl von Clausewitz, On War 76 (Michael Howard & 
Peter Paret eds. & trans. 1984).    
Later scholars have given the name “The War Puzzle” to this phenomenon.  “[S]tates led by rational 
decisionmakers should not fight because both sides could avoid the costs and risks of war by negotiating a 
prewar bargain reflecting their relative power . . . . Since wars do happen, it appears that states overestimate 
their relative power.  At the brink of war, history tells us, rivals’ estimates of their chances of winning 
commonly sum to more than 100 percent – for example, both think that they have more than a 50 percent 
chance of winning (one thinks it has an 80 percent chance and the other thinks its chance is 40 percent), an 
attitude that betrays unwarranted confidence on one or both sides.” Dominic D.P. Johnson, Overconfidence 
and War:  The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions 4 (2004). 
122 Those who doubt the very possibility of a war between European powers should reflect on the reasons why 
Britain, France and Russia all opposed German reunification in 1989.  See Philip Zelikow & Condoleezza 
Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed:  A Study in Statecraft 114-18; 132-34; 137-39; 144-45; 
204-08 (1995). See also Art, supra n.--, at 10-14.  Indeed, many Germans opposed reunification out of self-
mistrust, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, despite being the chief architect of reunification, insisted on a policy 
of “Europeanizing Germany, not Germanizing Europe.”  Id. at 23-4.  
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American hegemony, from this perspective, is not that the United States will intervene in 
European affairs, but that it will turn its back on them.123 
The second major source of European misgivings about American hegemony is the 
fear that the United States will overplay the part, leading to the (further) loss of European 
political independence, cultural distinctiveness, or ability to influence world affairs.  Here, 
as before, one can discern the stirrings of what might eventually ripen into a traditional 
Great Power rivalry – though in this case the rivals would not be the different continental 
powers themselves, but the EU and the United States.  The EU is now a match, or even 
more than a match, for the United States in several key dimensions:  not militarily, to be 
sure,124 but in terms of population, wealth, and (increasingly) global influence.125 Indeed, we 
 
True, what is called “democratic peace theory” – the doctrine that democracies never (or rarely) go to war 
with each other – would suggest that the chance of war between or among Western European powers is 
negligible.  But even though democratic peace theory seems to guide American foreign policy, there are 
substantial reasons, both theoretical and empirical, to doubt its truth.  See Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant:  
The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” 19 Int’l Security 5 (1994). 
123 This fear is by no means unrealistic, especially given the “casualty-aversion phenomenon” that has been so 
prominent a feature of America’s recent military operations.  (I take that term from Colonel Charles J. 
Dunlop, Jr.’s essay, A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World, available at 
http://www.usafa.af.mil/documents/virwar.doc.)   As Colonel Dunlop points outs, both the United States’ 
electorate and its military have exhibited a marked aversion to incurring virtually any friendly casualties in 
most military operations (consider, e.g., the United States’ refusal to use ground troops in the Kosovo 
campaign; the United States’ hasty withdrawal from Somalia caused by the deaths there of 18 Rangers during 
a 1993 mission; or the American public’s misgivings about the current war in Iraq, despite the small number 
– by historical standards – of U.S. casualties in that war).   Even more strikingly, Colonel Dunlop notes the 
American public’s apparent demand that wars be won with the minimum number of casualties on the 
enemy’s side, even when those losses are inflicted without violating the Laws of War.   In the First Gulf War, 
for instance, the American public recoiled at the bombing of Baghdad’s Al Firdos bunker, an underground 
command and control facility that was also being used to shelter the families of high Iraqi officials.  See also 
Barnett, supra n.--, at 46 (“Perhaps the logical extreme was reached in the Clinton Administration’s 1994 
cruise missile attack on Iraq in retaliation for the failed assassination plot against ex-President Bush.  The 
launches were carried out against the Iraqi intelligence agency that planned the attempt.  But they were 
executed at night, when the guilty parties were almost certain not to be in their offices.”); Allan C. Stam, III, 
Win, Lose, or Draw:  Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War 27 (1999) (levels of violence Americans 
inflicted on North Vietnamese unnerved the deliverers of the violence, not its recipients);  
124 On Europe’s military liabilities, see Lieber, supra n.--, at 85-88.   
125 See Rifkin, supra n.--, at 61 (“The European Union, what some observers call the ‘reluctant empire,’ is 
already a looming giant, although still in its infancy.  Four hundred and fifty-five million people are citizens of 
the European Union.  They represent nearly 7 percent of the human race. . . . [T]he EU already overwhelms 
the U.S., whose 293 million people constitute 4.6 percent of the human race . . . . The European Union is 
now the largest single internal market as well as the largest trader of goods in the world.  The EU is also the 
world’s largest trader in services. . . . The European Union’s Gross Domestic Product of $10.5 trillion in 
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might conceivably be seeing, at the start of the 21st century, a curious reversal of 19th century 
roles:  an emerging European giant on one side of the Atlantic, economically strong but as 
yet militarily weak; and an established Great Power on the American side, militarily 
formidable but perhaps past its economic prime.126 At any rate, given the growing strength 
and self-confidence of the EU, the disappearance of the Soviet threat to Europe, the 
embarrassments that the American alliance can create for Europe in the Islamic world, and 
the irksomeness of American leadership, we should expect to find – and we do find – 
emerging conflicts of interest between the United States and Europe. 
It should come as no surprise that international law might be used as an instrument 
to advance or retard the pursuit of such interests.   For better or for worse, international law 
lends itself readily to the needs of Great Power statecraft:  Josef Joffe was not far wrong in 
saying that international law is “a most pliant code [that] nations have always bent to their 
purposes.”127 For much of the Cold War, the United States routinely castigated the Soviet 
bloc for its violations of international human rights law, while turning a blind eye (or a near-
blind eye) to human rights violations in countries such as Marcos’ Philippines, Pinochet’s 
Chile, Samoza’s Nicaragua or, for that matter, the Soviet Union (during the early 1970s, in 
the pursuit of détente).  Or, to take an interesting but less well known example, Great 
Britain declared war on Germany in 1914 allegedly on the basis of Germany’s violation of 
 
2003 already exceeds the United States’ $10.4 trillion GDP . . . . The bottom line is that the EU’s GDP 
already comprises nearly 30 percent of the GDP of the world, making the European Union a formidable 
competitor to America in the global economy.”).   
126 See, e.g. Kupchan,  supra n.--, at 62 (“The near-term challenger to America is not a single country trying to 
play catch-up – which takes time – but a European Union that is in the process of aggregating the impressive 
economic resources that its member nations already possess. . . .  [A]mass their collective wealth, add the 
resources of more than a dozen other European countries – perhaps including before too long a recovered 
Russia – and an economic behemoth is on the horizon.”) 
127 Joffe, supra n.--, at 48. 
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Belgium’s neutrality, of which Britain claimed to be, by treaty, the guarantor.128 But 
Germany had previously invaded Luxembourg, whose neutrality Britain had also 
guaranteed, with no demurral by the British.  The crucial difference was the Belgium 
fronted the English Channel – a zone of extreme strategic sensitivity to Britain – while 
Luxembourg did not.129 Although Britain’s true concern was the German threat to its 
national security rather than Germany’s violation of international law,130 it was in no way 
remarkable that it should have advanced the latter rather than the former as its stated 
reason for war. 
 Several commentators have contended that Europe has been using international 
law as a means to control and restrain American hegemony.   Their arguments are 
persuasive.  The American political scientists John Ikenberry,131 and following him Stephen 
Walt,132 have made a careful study of the various mechanism by which European and other 
powers have responded to the massive reality of American global power.  Ikenberry notes 
that there are two “extreme” or “ideal-type” strategies for coping with such concentrated 
power.  One strategy, which he calls “balancing,” is to attempt to resist a dominant State 
 
128 British leaders and high-ranking officials, including Prime Minister William Gladstone in 1870, had long 
doubted whether Belgian Guarantee Treaty of 1839 committed Britain unconditionally to resist and violation 
of Belgian neutrality.  See Carr, supra n.--, at 183-84.  Some legal scholars during the First World War also 
argued that Britain did not, in fact, have any treaty obligations to guarantee Belgian neutrality. See Alexander 
Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium:  A Study of the Belgian Case Under its Aspects in Political History and 
International Law (1915). 
129 See Blainey, supra n.--, at 236 n*. 
130 According to the official report of August 4, 1914 prepared by the British Ambassador to Germany, Sir 
Edward Goschen, he personally informed the German Chancellor that “it was, so to speak, a matter of ‘life 
and death’ for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to 
defend Belgium’s neutrality if attacked.  That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence 
could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?”  See 
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/scrapofpaper1.htm. Prime Minister Sir Edward Grey’s speech of 
August 3, 1914 before the House of Commons spoke more candidly of Britain’s “obligations of honour and 
interest as regards the Belgian treaty.”  65 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series, 
1914, at 1809 (emphasis added). 
131 See g. John Ikenberry, “Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence:  Great Power Politics in the Age of 
Unipolarity,” National Intelligence Council Conference Report (July 28, 2003), available at 
http;//wwww.cia.gov/nic/confreports__stratreact.html.     
132 See Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power:  The Global Response to U.S. Primacy 144-52 (2005). 
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through aggregating countervailing power by forming a coalition against it.  The opposite 
strategy, which he calls “binding,” attempts to make the dominant power less threatening by 
“embedding that power in rules and institutions that channel and limit the ways that power 
is exercised.”133 Both strategies, of course, can be manifested in a rich variety of ways; each 
has its strengths and limitations; both can be pursued, separately or together, with greater or 
less overt hostility.  In addition to “balancing” and “binding,” weaker States can follow 
strategies that Ikenberry calls “buffering” (or developing alternative regional political 
spheres); “baiting” (or forming groupings of weaker States that are designed in part to lure 
the dominant State into interaction, and eventually conformity, with the groupings); 
“bargaining”; “bandwagoning” (or adopting policies designed to support or accommodate 
the dominant power); “bonding” (a version of bandwagoning in which the leaders of 
weaker powers since to form “special relationships” with the United States or its President); 
and “specialization” (or seeking out niche specialities in military and economic affairs that 
may prove useful or necessary to the dominant State). 
Europe’s uses of international law can readily be seen as a type of “binding” strategy 
enabling it more effectively to tame American power.  Such a strategy can be pursued, and 
correspondingly resisted, in at least two broad ways.   
The first way is by attempting to reduce the United States’ freedom of action by 
inducing it to enter into international institutions or to accept international rules that would 
create new international obligations for it.  Obvious examples here would be the Rome 
Statute or the Kyoto Protocol which, if ratified by the United States, would have bound it to 
commitments that its political leadership considered inimical to its security interests and its 
economic vitality.  American responses to these proposed new institutions included, not 
 
133 Ikenberry, supra n.--, at 14. 
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merely the refusal to join them, but also, e.g., attempts to carve out special immunities from 
ICC jurisdiction for the U.S. military forces in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.134 
The second way is by arguing that the United States is breaching its existing 
international legal commitments or obligations, and by applying, or threatening to apply, 
legal or diplomatic sanctions as a result.   Thus, for example, European governments might 
cite to alleged U.S. violations of international human rights agreements or provisions of 
international humanitarian law to which the United States is a party.  The United States 
typically replies by denying the factual allegations at issue, or by pleading circumstances 
claimed to excuse or justify its actions, or by interpreting the relevant legal obligations more 
narrowly.  At the extreme, the United States might rescind its earlier legal commitments as, 
e.g., it has done (or sought to do) by withdrawing its consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction in 
Consular Convention cases.135 
American political scientists are not alone in viewing European-American clashes 
over international law through the prism of interest analysis, and in seeing the use of a 
binding strategy at work in at least some European legal claims.  Josef Joffe is one such 
European commentator is Josef Joffe. In his 2003 John Bonython Lecture, Gulliver 
Unbound:  Can America Rule the World?,136 Joffe argued that many recent “international 
law” disputes between the United States and other powers are, “[a]u fond, . . . not about 
principle, but power. . . .  [S]o with the International Criminal Court (ICC).  In the end, 
even the Clinton team correctly understood the underlying thrust of the ICC.  Claiming the 
right to pass judgment on military interventions by prosecuting malfeasants ex post facto, 
 
134 See Bryan MacPherson, “Authority of the Security Council to Exempt Peacemakers from International 
Criminal Proceedings,” ASIL Insights (July 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insight89.htm.
135 See Frederick L. Kirgis, “Addendum to ASIL Insight:, President Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican 
Nationals and Consular Convention Rights,” ASIL Insight (March 2005), available at 
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the Court might deter and thus constrain American forays abroad.  All the Lilliputians [i.e., 
the Europeans] would gain a kind of droit de regard over American actions.”137 
An interest-based theory of the kind put forward by writers such as Ikenberry, Walt 
and Joffe appears to have as much power as Rubenfeld’s in explaining the rifts between 
Europe and America over international law.  What is more, an interest-based account may 
be more successful than a values-based one in explaining why European and American 
differences in international law can be, and sometimes are, compromised.  
To illustrate this aspect of interest analysis, consider Security Council Resolution 
1483 of May 22, 2003, which, together with subsequent related Resolutions, addressed the 
international standing of the Iraqi government that was beginning to emerge after the 
Second Gulf War, and delineated roles for the various institutions, including the United 
Nations, in the transition to a new, internationally recognized Iraqi government. 
 Resolution 1483, which was sponsored by the United States and its coalition allies 
Britain and Spain, was adopted by a 14-0 vote in the Security Council (Syria being notably 
absent).  As one commentator said, the Resolution “bore the hallmarks of a compromise 
throughout.”138 Specifically, it created a loose framework under which the Anglo-American 
dominated Coalition Provisional Authority [“CPA”], a contemplated “Iraqi interim 
administration . . . run by Iraqis” and distinct from the CPA, and the United Nations would 
together share responsibilities with respect to the transition to an internationally recognized, 
representative government Iraq.  The Resolution lifted longstanding international sanctions 
against the régime of Saddam Hussein and, in a move much desired by the United States, 
guaranteed United Nations’ participation in monitoring the export of Iraqi oil, making it 
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138 Thomas D. Grant, “The Security Council and Iraq:  An Incremental Practice,” 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 823, 824 
(2003). 
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possible for the oil to be sold in world markets without legal hazard.   On the other hand, 
as the French delegate to the Security Council, M. de la Sablière, insisted, the Resolution 
also ensured that the United Nations would play a crucial political as well as humanitarian 
role alongside the Anglo-American coalition in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq,139 and 
he reminded that coalition that the Resolution “affirm[ed] the obligations of the occupying 
Powers in this area, in conformity with their obligations under international humanitarian 
law.”140 Mr. Pluger, the German delegate, after noting that the Resolution was “a 
compromise reached after intensive and sometimes difficult negotiations,” also laid stress 
on the fact that the United Nations was to have “a central role in the political and economic 
process” of reconstruction.141 
As legal commentators noted, one outstanding and unresolved point of difference 
between the Anglo-Americans and their continental European antagonists concerned “the 
ex post validating effect, if any, of Resolution 1483.”142 Was the Resolution to be construed 
as a legal ratification of the coalition’s armed intervention in Iraq in March, 2003 – over the 
prospective authorization of which the Security Council and its Permanent Members had 
been so bitterly divided three months earlier?  Did it fall short of a ratification of the 
 
139 “From the Franco-German-Russian viewpoint, the resolution . . . serves two purposes:  it reengages the 
[United Nations] after a period of relative withdrawal; and it contains the American-British coalition, the 
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tirelessly defended.  More than ever before, the strong and independent involvement of the United Nations 
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ownership by the Iraqi people and its acceptance by countries of the region and by the international 
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original intervention, but nonetheless have some legal effect on the ensuing occupation?143 
Or was it, legally, a nullity?
The U.S. State Department did not explicitly claim that Resolution 1483 ratified 
what had previously been an unauthorized and illegal Charter violation.  How could it have 
done so, given its own arguments earlier in the year that the United States’ resumption of 
hostilities in Iraq accorded with Iraq-related Security Council Resolutions from a decade 
before?  On the other hand, the State Department did try to squeeze legal juice out of the 
lemon.  In November, 2003, a State Department spokesman, Assistant Secretary Kim R. 
Holmes, characterized Resolution 1483 in the following way: 
We do not want to find ourselves implying that, since the [Security] Council could 
not agree on a military course of action during the debate in February [2003] on a 
second resolution, that it was the will of the international community that Saddam 
Hussein be allowed to continue to torture and murder his people.  The Council, in 
fact, had spoken on the matter, and indeed it has spoken since . . . . [I]n Resolution 
1483, it has recognized the legitimacy of the coalition presence under international 
law.[144]
What this characterization leaves unexplained, of course, is why the United States 
should have desired the Security Council to affirm that coalition’s presence in Iraq was 
legitimate, if the United States found itself in Iraq as a result of having taken nothing but 
lawful steps. 
No matter.  The key point is that the United States and the European nations 
aligned against it in the Security Council found in Resolution 1483 a viable and pragmatic 
way to compromise (if not resolve) their bitter differences over the legality of the Iraq 
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War.145 The United States could hardly ask for -- and perhaps fail to obtain -- the 
ratification of an invasion that it had defended as fully legal not long before; but it did want 
some measure of affirmative legal authorization going forward for its presence in Iraq and 
for its activities as occupier (if not as invader).  If, moreover, this prospective legitimation 
could plausibly be construed as an admission by the Council, however tacitly and 
grudgingly, that it had been wrong to withhold authorization in advance of the Iraq war, 
then so much the better.  For their part, the French, Germans and Russians all had an 
interest in conferring some measure of legitimacy on the U.S. occupation, while being able 
to maintain consistently the position that the original U.S. intervention had been 
unauthorized.  The U.S. occupation of Iraq was, by May 2003, an established fact; and to 
allow the United States to continue its occupation indefinitely without the sanction of the 
Security Council could over time only weaken the Council’s (and therefore their) influence 
and authority.  These three Council Members likely felt that the currency they possessed – 
the power to legitimate the coalition’s actions – had to be spent before it dwindled in value.  
Both sides had a compelling interest in saying that the Iraq War had not stripped the 
Security Council of its legal authority, brought down the United Nations Charter, or caused 
irreparable damage to the fabric of international law. 
 Put it this way:  at the time of Resolution 1483’s adoption, the relationship 
between the United States on the one side and the Franco-German-Russian bloc on the 
other was not unlike that which existed on December 2, 1804 in the Cathedral of Notre 
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Dame in Paris between Napoléon on the one side and Pope Pius VII on the other, as the 
Pope watched Napoléon, who was standing (rather than kneeling) before him, lift the 
crown of the Emperor of the French out of the papal hands and place it on his own head.146 
Both Napoléon and the Pope had something to gain from this curious transaction (to 
which the Pope had agreed beforehand).  From Napoléon’s point of view, his action was a 
way of dramatizing the claim that his authority did not come from the Church, but from 
another source (himself?).  At the same time, however, the Pope had anointed Napoléon 
only shortly before; and the Pope’s very presence at the Emperor’s (self-)coronation lent 
Napoléon’s claim to the imperial title a legitimacy that it otherwise would have lacked.  A 
papal consecration at the cathedral in Paris conferred on the new Emperor a cachet in 
royalist, Catholic and international circles that Napoléon could never have created for 
himself.147 So it was between the United States and the Security Council:  the holder of 
power and the holders of legitimacy found it in their mutual interest to agree rather than 
disagree.  
III. 
 So far, I have been contrasting two theories that offer to explain, on different 
grounds, the existence of a characteristic divergence in attitudes towards international law 
between Europe and the United States.  One theory sounds in values, the other in 
interests.  But the choice may conceivably be a false one.   This brief concluding section 
addresses that possibility. 
 While abstractions may be illuminating, we are surely be wrong to think of 
“Europe” (or the “United States”) as monoliths.  “European” attitudes towards 
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international law may, e.g., be either attitudes characteristic of European governments, or 
those characteristic of European publics.  European publics (especially perhaps certain 
élites within them) may have views about the morality or legality of American policies that 
are held with great intensity and conviction.  Those constituencies, who may be important 
actors in European domestic politics, will urge their views forcefully on their elected 
political leaders.  These leaders, in turn, will be likely to engage in what the Israeli political 
scientist Gil Merom calls “sisterly vigilance” of the United States.148 Democratic 
governments exercise such “sisterly vigilance” when they seek publicly to restrain other 
democracies from engaging in what they perceive to be radical departures from accepted 
international standards, particularly in the conduct of war.  A good example is Sweden’s 
criticism of the United States’ use of certain weapons systems during the war in Vietnam 
during the 1960s.149 
But because European political leaders, especially in the executive branches of 
European governments, have to interact repeatedly with their American counterparts on a 
wide range of matters of common concern, their criticisms of American war and counter-
terrorism policies is likely to be tempered with a high degree of pragmatism.  If their 
American counterparts are offended by what they perceive as “excessive” European 
condemnation or resistance, the resulting bitterness and antagonism may preclude 
cooperation on other, important issues.  (For instance, while American leaders may have 
been willing to forgive France for opposing a Security Council Resolution that would have 
authorized intervention in Iraq in 2003, they apparently felt deeply aggrieved by the French 
Foreign Minister’s trip to Africa to enlist African governments’ votes against such a 
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Resolution.)  In fashioning their policy choices, European leaders therefore have to keep 
an eye both on their domestic constituencies (not all of which will feel strongly averse to 
alleged American violations of international law) and on the likely reactions of their 
American counterparts.  Their dealings with the United States form, as Robert Putnam 
calls it, a two-level game. 
For these reasons, we should expect to find, not so much a divergence between 
European and American views of international law, but rather two divergences, one greater 
and one less: a more marked divergence between American views (or rather, the views of 
American political leaders) and the views of European publics (especially, perhaps, 
articulate and influential élites in sectors such as higher education, law and journalism),  
and a less marked divergence between American political leaders’ views and the views of 
European governments (especially the executive branches that interact most frequently with 
those American political leaders).   And this, we submit, is exactly what we see in the rather 
equivocal remarks of Chancellor Merkel cited near the start of this paper.  While both 
interests and values will likely figure in explaining both of these divergences, values will 
likely be more important in explaining the extent of the first divergence, and interests the 
comparatively limited divergence in the second case.   
Conclusion
The argument of this paper has been, first, that the differences between America 
and Europe over international law and international institutions are not as stark and 
unqualified as they are often represented to be and, second and more importantly, that 
such attitudinal differences as there are can be explained as plausibly in terms of the play of 
conflicting power interests as in terms of constitutional outlooks, structures and histories.  
Without in the least denying the force and persuasiveness of an explanation that locates the 
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sources of antagonism in a characteristically European “international constitutionalism” to a 
characteristically American “democratic constitutionalism,” a more banal explanation in 
terms of divergent and competing national interests may well suffice.  Finally, the analysis 
presented here also suggests that the two approaches might well be understood, not as 
offering rival explanations of a unitary phenomenon, but as offering compatible 
explanations of two distinct but related phenomena – the attitudes of European publics on 
the one hand, and European governments on the other.  
